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Articles
Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative
Deterrence
THOMAS GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN* AND JAMES C. HATHAWAY**
Developed states have what might charitably be called
a schizophrenic attitude towards international refugee
law. Determined to remain formally engaged with
refugee law and yet unwavering in their commitment
to avoid assuming their fair share of practical responsibilities under that regime, wealthier countries have
embraced the politics of non-entrée, comprising efforts to keep refugees away from their territories but
without formally resiling from treaty obligations. As
the early generation of non-entrée practices—visa
controls and carrier sanctions, the establishment of
“international zones,” and high seas deterrence—
have proved increasingly vulnerable to practical and
legal challenges, new forms of non-entrée predicated
on interstate cooperation have emerged in which deterrence is carried out by the authorities of the home
or a transit state, or at least in their territory.
The critical question we address here is whether such
cooperation-based mechanisms of non-entrée are—as
developed states seem to believe—capable of insulating them from legal liability in ways that the first generation of non-entrée strategies were not. We show
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that three evolving areas of international law—
jurisdiction, shared responsibility, and liability for
aiding or assisting—are likely to stymie many if not
all of the new forms of non-entrée. Powerful states
are thus faced with a trade-off between the efficiency
of non-entrée mechanisms and the ability to avoid responsibility under international refugee law. If, as we
believe probable, the preference for more rather than
less control persists, legal challenges are likely to
prove successful. Law will thus be in a position to
serve a critical role in provoking a frank conversation
about how to replace the duplicitous politics of nonentrée with a system predicated on the meaningful
sharing of the burdens and responsibilities of refugee
protection around the world.
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INTRODUCTION
Wealthier states have a near-obsession with migration control,
spending billions of dollars each year in the hope of securing their
borders.1 Their objective is not, of course, to prevent the entry of all
1. In 2012, the United States spent $18 billion on border control. Doris Meissner et
al., Immigration Enforcement in the United States: The Rise of a Formidable Machinery,
MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (2013). Australia had a budget of AU$1.67 billion for the 2013–14
operational year. AUSTRALIAN CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION SERVICE, BUDGET 2013–
14, at 101 (2013). Combined spending for the twenty-eight E.U. member states is difficult
to compile, but the European Union itself has allocated €1.82 billion between 2007 and 2013
through its External Borders Fund. DIRECTORATE-GENERAL HOME AFFAIRS, SUMMARY OF
STAKEHOLDER RESPONSES TO THE PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON THE FUTURE OF EU FUNDING
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outsiders. To the contrary, developed states compete to attract those
they believe likely to contribute to their well-being through trade,
tourism, and the provision of labor.2 But the uninvited—including
most unskilled and humanitarian migrants—are not welcome.
Many persons seeking opportunity, safety, or some combination of the two will nonetheless feel compelled to vote with their feet,
often traveling to precisely those more prosperous and secure states
that resist their arrival. The dissonance between their often powerful
human needs and desires and generalized policies of migration control has spawned a never-ending race between border authorities and
ever more inventive human smugglers: for each loophole closed by
officials, two new modes of unauthorized entry seem to emerge.3
And even if this practical challenge to the developed world’s deterrent agenda could somehow be answered, there is a second obstacle
to the ideal of watertight border control that is the focus of this Article: refugees (and some others) hold a trump card on migration control.
Under international law, refugees are entitled to arrive of their
own initiative, may not be penalized for unlawful arrival or presence,
and must be protected for the duration of risk in their home country.4
FOR HOME AFFAIRS POLICIES

(2011).

2. See Ayelet Schachar, The Race for Talent: Highly Skilled Migrants and
Competitive Immigration Regimes, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 148 (2006); STEPHEN CASTLES ET AL.,
THE AGE OF MIGRATION: INTERNATIONAL POPULATION MOVEMENTS IN THE MODERN WORLD
(5th ed. 2013); ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, GLOBALIZATION: THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES (1998).
3. Rey Koslowski, Economic Globalization, Human Smuggling, and Global
Governance, in GLOBAL HUMAN SMUGGLING: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 60, 81 (David
Kyle & Rey Koslowski eds., 2d ed. 2011); Ruben Hernandez-Leon, Conceptualizing the
Migration Industry, in THE MIGRATION INDUSTRY AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 24, 31–32 (Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen & Ninna Nyberg
Sørensen eds., 2013).
4. The duty of non-penalization is set by article 31 of the Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees. See generally JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 405–12 (2005). The right to remain for the duration of risk follows
from article 33’s duty of non-refoulement. Cognate duties of non-refoulement arise under
some other human rights instruments, including the 1966 International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, the 1984 Convention Against Torture, the 1989 Convention on the
Rights of the Child, the 1989 American Convention on Human Rights, and the 1950
European Convention on Human Rights. Id. at 368–69; THOMAS GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN,
ACCESS TO ASYLUM: INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF MIGRATION
CONTROL 81–94 (2011); JANE MCADAM, COMPLEMENTARY PROTECTION UNDER
INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW (2007). Some scholars claim that the principle of nonrefoulement has become universally binding customary international law. See Elihu
Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of the Duty of Non-Refoulement,
in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR’S GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON
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Indeed, refugee status is not “granted” by states at all, but is rather an
international status that states are bound to recognize.5 Because a
person is a refugee in consequence of his or her de facto circumstances rather than by virtue of any official validation of same, border
officials will inevitably be confronted by persons legally entitled to
the provisional benefit of the robust duty of non-refoulement as soon
as they come under that state’s jurisdiction.6 The duty of nonrefoulement, codified in Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, prohibits states from exposing a refugee “in any manner whatsoever” to
the risk of being persecuted for a Convention reason.7 It thus
amounts to a de facto duty to admit the refugee at least until the refugee claim is examined, since admission is normally the only means of
avoiding the alternative, impermissible consequence of exposure to
risk.8 This is, of course, a significant fetter on the permissible scope
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 87–177 (Erika Feller et al. eds., 2001). But see James
Hathaway, Leveraging Asylum, 45 TEXAS INT’L L.J. 503 (arguing that the relatively
consistent state practice required for a customary norm of non-refoulement to come into
being does not in fact exist). The required protection for the duration of risk need not occur
in the country to which the refugee travels, but may be fairly shared among state parties. See
JAMES C. HATHAWAY & MICHELLE FOSTER, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 30–49 (2d ed.
2014).
5. See Directive 2011/95/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13
December 2011 on Standards for the Qualification of Third- Country Nationals, 2011 O.J. (L
337/9), preamble ¶ 21 (“The recognition of refugee status is a declaratory act”); see also
Jószef Németh v. Minister of Justice, [2010] S.C.R. 56, ¶ 50 (Can.) (“Under the Refugee
Convention, refugee status depends on the circumstances at the time the inquiry is made; it is
not dependent on formal findings.”). On the declaratory nature of refugee status, see
HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 4, at 158–59,
and U.N. High Commissioner Comm. for Refugees, Handbook and Guidelines on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV. 3
(Dec. 2011).
6. Refugee Convention rights accrue incrementally, with states owing those asserting
refugee status the provisional benefit of some rights. See infra note 99.
7. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
See generally HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 4, at 279–370.
8. GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, supra note 4, at 27. That refugees are swept up in
generalized deterrent efforts is patently clear, as has been reported in the case of persons
returned by Italy to Libya. See Hirsi Jamaa v. It., 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 97. Nor is it the case
that those deterred and sent back to risky situations can be assumed not to be refugees at all.
Ninety-four percent of asylum claims made in Australia by persons arriving by boat during
the short-lived suspension of deterrent efforts from late 2008 until the end of 2010 were
found to be genuine. Verity Edwards, Boat Arrivals Almost All Get Visas, THE AUSTRALIAN
(Feb. 25, 2011), www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/boat-arrivals-almost-all-getvisas/story-fn7dlx76-1226011619093.
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of migration control efforts.9
Most confronting of all for destination states, the process of
distinguishing a refugee entitled by law to enter and remain from an
ordinary migrant subject to domestic discretionary rules is not
straightforward, usually requiring a careful evaluation of the facts of
an individual’s circumstances in relation to international legal standards. If international law is not to be breached, the non-citizen who
either claims asylum or who is recognizable as coming from a refugee-producing situation must in practice be allowed to remain for the
duration of the assessment of her status.10 The net result is that what
would arguably be the most efficient means of implementing stringent border controls against the uninvited—a universal policy of immediate turnbacks of unauthorized non-citizens—is legally foreclosed.
In theory, the developed world could simply withdraw from
the refugee law regime. Whereas the refugee regime once served
their interests fairly directly—enabling European states to avoid instability in the wake of mass influxes of refugees across relatively
porous borders during the early part of the twentieth century, and later giving an international imprimatur to the sheltering of the enemies
of these states’ ideological adversaries after the Second World
War11—such imperatives no longer exist. There are, however, strong
if more diffuse reasons for the developed world to remain a part of
the refugee regime—for example, the domestic political value of being engaged in a process that systematizes humanitarian benevolence
and an understandable reluctance to unpack a complex system of international law that supports broader political and economic agendas
of value to the industrialized world.12 But most fundamentally,
9. See Kazimierz Bem, The Coming of a “Blank Cheque”—Europe, the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol, 16 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 609 (2004); James C. Hathaway,
Can International Refugee Law be Made Relevant Again?, in RECONCEIVING
INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW xviii (1997).
10. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 4,
at 158–59.
11. The reasons for the development of the refugee law system are discussed in James
C. Hathaway, The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law: 1920–1950, 33 INT’L
& COMP. L.Q. 348 (1984). See Atle Grahl-Madsen, The European Tradition of Asylum and
the Development of Refugee Law, 3 J. PEACE RESEARCH 278 (1966); B. S. Chimni, The
Geopolitics of Refugee Studies: A View from the South, 11 J. REFUGEE STUD. 350 (1998);
Matthew J. Gibney & Randall Hansen, Asylum Policy in the West: Past Trends, Future
Possibilities, U.N. University Discussion Paper No. 2003/68 (2003).
12. Alexander Betts & Jean-Francois Durieux, Convention Plus as a Norm-Setting
Exercise, 20 J. REFUGEE STUD. 511 (2007); THE REFUGEE CONVENTION 50 YEARS ON:
GLOBALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Susan Kneebone ed., 2003); Bem, supra note 9.
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wealthier states realize the critical symbolic importance of appearing
to remain engaged with the global refugee regime.
Simply put, migratory and other pressures on the developed
world are significantly attenuated by the efforts of the less developed
states in which the overwhelming majority of the world’s refugees
now live.13 If the global north were to withdraw entirely from refugee law, there would be no politically viable basis upon which to insist that poorer countries continue to shoulder their refugee law obligations under the current system of atomized responsibility and
fluctuating charity from the wealthier world. And if less developed
states were to follow suit and abandon refugee law in the context of
continued instability in much of the global south—producing often
massive refugee flows—the negative ramifications for both global
security and economic well-being could be immense.14 Indeed, with
fewer options to find protection close to home, the logic for refugees
of seeking protection farther afield would surely increase—a scenario
that wealthier countries do not wish even to contemplate.
In short, while refugee law matters to developed states today
for a variety of reasons,15 the most important is that it conscripts less
developed countries to act in ways that provide a critical support to
the developed world’s migration control project. Critically, this more
diffuse rationale for continued engagement with refugee law does not
require the same level of hands-on, substantively meaningful implementation of refugee law by powerful states as was once the case.
Developed countries today believe that their interests can be achieved
by means of symbolic, rather than substantive, engagement with refugee law. Whether the goal is to placate domestic humanitarian constituencies, to avoid the unraveling of the international law regime, or
to be seen standing shoulder-to-shoulder with the poorer states that
actually make refugee protection work, optics are at the core of what
matters. Powerful states therefore see value in showing their commitment to refugee law but would prefer—to the greatest extent possible—to avoid being subject to its practical strictures. In particular,
13. See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Global Trends 2012: Displacement,
The New 21st Century Challenge, 2 (2013), available at http://www.unhcr.org/
51bacb0f9.html.
14. Gibney & Hansen, supra note 11, at 16. See generally Laura Barnett, Global
Governance and the Evolution of the International Refugee Regime, 14 INT’L J. REFUGEE L.
238 (2002); GLOBAL MIGRANTS, GLOBAL REFUGEES: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS (Aristide R.
Zolberg & Peter M. Benda eds., 2001).
15. See James C. Hathaway, Why Refugee Law Still Matters, 8 MELB. J. INT’L L. 89,
98–100 (2007); Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, International Refugee Law and Refugee
Policy: The Case of Deterrence Policies, 27 J. REFUGEE STUD. 574, 579–83 (2014).
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the developed world does not wish to be faced with the expectation
that follows from the duty of non-refoulement, namely that refugees
who manage to get to their jurisdiction are entitled to assert protection claims against them.16
This seemingly schizophrenic posture has given rise to the
politics of non-entrée.17 Whereas refugee law is predicated on the
duty of non-refoulement, the politics of non-entrée is based on a
commitment to ensuring that refugees shall not be allowed to arrive.
Over the last three decades, even as powerful states routinely affirmed their commitment to refugee law,18 they have worked assiduously to design and implement non-entrée policies that seek to keep
most refugees from accessing their jurisdiction, and thus being in a
position to assert their entitlement to the benefits of refugee law. For
many years, visa controls and carrier sanctions have been instituted
to prevent even persons fleeing clearly refugee-producing countries
from reaching the industrialized world by air.19 Airports, harbors,
coastlines, and islands have been declared to be non-territory for purposes of protection responsibilities.20 And states have resorted to
maritime interception on the high seas in a desperate effort to take
deterrent action in a place thought not to attract legal liability.21
16. Virginie Guiraudon & Gallya Lahav, A Reappraisal of the State Sovereignty
Debate: The Case of Migration Control, 33 COMP. POL. STUD. 163, 178 (2000); MIGRATION
& THE EXTERNALITIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (Sandra Lavenex & Emek Ucarer eds.,
2002); IN SEARCH OF EUROPE’S BORDERS (Kees Groenendijk et al. eds., 2002).
17. See generally James Hathaway, The Emerging Politics of Non-Entrée, 91
REFUGEES 40 (1992) (this term was first employed in this article).
18. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Declaration of States Parties to the 1951
Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc.
HCR/MMSP/2001/09 (Jan. 16, 2002); Ministerial Intergovernmental Event on Refugees and
Stateless Persons, Dec. 7–8, 2011, Pledges 2011 (Dec. 8, 2011), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/4ff55a319.pdf; Erika Feller, Asylum, Migration & Refugee Protection:
Realities, Myths and the Promise of Things to Come, 18 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 509, 523–24
(2006).
19. See Frances Nicholson, Implementation of the Immigration (Carriers’ Liability)
Act 1987: Privatising Immigration Functions at the Expense of International Obligations,
46 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 586 (1997); ANTONIO CRUZ, SHIFTING RESPONSIBILITY: CARRIERS’
LIABILITY IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NORTH AMERICA (1995).
20. See Tugba Basaran, Legal Borders in Europe: The Waiting Zone, in A THREAT
AGAINST EUROPE: SECURITY, MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION 63, 68 (Peter Burgess & Serge
Gutwirth eds., 2011); Nicholson, supra note 19, at 588. See generally Mark B. Salter,
Governmentalities of an Airport: Heterotopia and Confession, 1 INT’L POL. SOC. 49 (2007).
21. Stephen H. Legomsky, The USA and the Caribbean Interdiction Programme, 18
INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 677, 681, 687 (2006); Susan Kneebone, The Pacific Plan: The
Provision of “Effective Protection?,” 18 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 696, 709–10 (2006); Andreas
Fischer-Lescano, Tillman Löhr & Timo Tohidipur, Border Control at Sea: Requirements
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These non-entrée policies promised to insulate developed
countries from de facto compliance with the duty of non-refoulement
even as they left the duty itself intact. Non-entrée allows wealthier
states to insist upon the importance of refugee protection as a matter
of international legal obligation, knowing that they will largely be
spared its burdens. It enables a pattern of minimalist engagement
under which the formal commitment to refugee law can be proclaimed as a matter of principle without risk that the wealthier world
will actually be compelled to live up to that regime’s burdens and responsibilities to any serious extent. Non-entrée mechanisms have
overall proved highly effective: the developed world today protects
less than 20% of the world’s refugees22 and is subject to no binding
duty even to share the costs of protection in the less developed world,
much less to resettle refugees to their own territories. Whether
measured in raw numbers, refugees per capita, or refugees per dollar
of GDP,23 the brutal reality is that the overwhelming majority of today’s refugees are in—and will remain in—many of the world’s
poorest countries.
The politics of non-entrée has thus facilitated a fundamentally
duplicitous stance on the part of the developed world in which the
value of refugee law is fervently proclaimed,24 even as its practical
impact is largely avoided. It is one thing to acknowledge that accidents of geography mean that the less developed world is likely to
continue to be the first port of call for the majority of the world’s refugees. But it is another thing entirely actively to exacerbate that
maldistribution of responsibility. The duty to protect refugees—if it
is in fact a general international legal obligation as states have said it
is—should be implemented in good faith by all.25 In our view, it is
high time to embark on a more honest discussion about the importance of refugee protection as a shared responsibility, equitably
implemented.
Our goal here is to show that principles of international law
have developed in ways that will facilitate a successful legal challenge to much of the non-entrée infrastructure that has been assemUnder International Human Rights and Refugee Law, 21 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 256, 265–68
(2009).
22. Volker Türk, Director of International Protection, U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees, Address to the 60th Meeting of the UNHCR Standing Committee 1, U.N. Doc.
EC/65/SC/CRP.101 (July 1, 2014), available at http://www.unhcr.org/53c8d1449.html.
23. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Global Trends 2012, supra note 13.
24. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
25. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
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bled by powerful states. Specifically, contemporary understandings
of jurisdiction, shared responsibility, and aiding or assisting—taken
together—can and should be invoked in aid of dismantling the nonentrée regime. Such legal action will in turn force a more honest political conversation about how best to reconceive international refugee protection as a substantively global responsibility.
To this end, in Part I we describe the politics of non-entrée as
it emerged and as it has evolved in practice. Simple modes of nonentrée—visa controls, carrier sanctions, and high seas interdiction—
have already proved vulnerable to both practical and legal challenge.
They have thus largely given way to a range of new cooperationbased policies, described in Part II, designed to conscript countries of
origin and of transit to effect migration control on behalf of the developed world. The overarching logic of this new generation of nonentrée policies is to insulate wealthier countries from liability by engaging the sovereignty of another country. Because these non-entrée
policies are implemented by, or under the jurisdiction of, the authorities of other countries, sponsoring states believe that they can immunize themselves from legal responsibility for the deterrence of
refugees and other persons entitled to international protection. The
net result is thus that deterrence is achieved even as liability is avoided.
In truth, these new, cooperation-based non-entrée policies are
rarely as “hands off” as developed states like to suggest. This is because true sub-contracting of deterrence to other countries would
mean that the sponsoring countries have less control, and hence reduced assurances of success. To minimize the risk of failure, developed states ordinarily become more directly engaged. We identify a
seven-part typology of new generation non-entrée practices based on
the degree of involvement by, or collaboration with, the sponsoring
state or states: reliance on diplomatic relations; the offering of financial incentives; the provision of equipment, machinery, or training;
deployment of officials of the sponsoring state; joint or shared enforcement; assumption of a direct migration control role; and the establishment or assignment of international agencies to effect interception.
In Parts III, IV, and V, we examine in detail the tools of public international law that we believe can be asserted to challenge this
new generation of cooperation-based non-entrée policies.
Part III looks to developments in the law of jurisdiction.
While once anchored nearly exclusively in notions of territorial control, jurisdiction is now understood also to be established in some situations in which control is taken over persons outside of a state’s territory, as well as in some circumstances in which a state exercises
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public powers outside of its territory. In our view, the territorial, personal, and public powers approaches to jurisdiction combine to force
accountability for a significantly more extensive range of non-entrée
actions than states believe.
Part IV complements the discussion of jurisdiction by examining the important evolution of the law of shared responsibility for
internationally wrongful acts. The “all or nothing” view under which
only one state would be held liable where combined action resulted
in a breach of international human rights law has given way to the
possibility of shared responsibility—not just where jurisdiction is
shared, but also where independent actions combine to produce a
common wrong, or where states collaborate to act through a single
entity.
Part V moves beyond the issue of shared responsibility to examine the situations in which liability may result from a state aiding
or assisting another country to breach international law. At least
where a state sponsoring non-entrée actions is aware that its contributions will lead to a breach of international law, liability may be established even where that state neither has jurisdiction nor takes any direct role in the commission of the wrongful act.
In sum, the trio of developments in relation to jurisdiction,
shared responsibility, and aiding or assisting means that states are
mistaken in their assumption that international legal obligations—in
particular, to respect the duty to avoid the refoulement of refugees—
are not enlivened when a state sponsors deterrent actions in some
other country. Especially when the sponsoring state or states engage
in more activist roles, it is in our view likely that international law as
it has evolved now affords the basis for holding them liable for
breaching the rules of refugee law they seek to avoid. Law can thus
play a critical role in engendering a more forthright conversation
among states about the means by which the burdens and responsibilities of refugee protection should be shared.
I. TRADITIONAL NON-ENTRÉE: CLEARLY DIMINISHED VIABILITY
The practice of non-entrée—comprising efforts by powerful
states to prevent refugees from ever reaching their jurisdiction at
which point they become entitled to the benefit of the duty of nonrefoulement and other core rights set by the Refugee Convention—
has long been a feature of the refugee protection landscape.
In perhaps the earliest incarnation of non-entrée, states subcontracted migration control to transportation companies. From the
early 1980s, the combination of visa controls (with a visa not being
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offered for the purpose of seeking refugee protection) and carrier
sanctions (under which those transporting persons without valid visas
are subject to significant fines, and even to having aircraft or other
vessels impounded) has compelled airlines and other transportation
companies to effect migration control at the point of departure.26 In
practice, both the employees of the carriers and the private security
firms they engage have come to carry out increasingly elaborate document and immigration checks, thereby denying refugees the right to
travel and hence to advance their claims to protection.27
A second favored form of non-entrée has been to establish socalled “international zones”—particularly in airports—in which some
or all of the legal obligations of the territorial state are declared not to
apply. Indeed, Australia purported to “excise” more than 3,500 islands from its migration zone in 2001, declaring that it had no protection obligations to any refugee arriving in these parts of its national
territory;28 this policy of excision has now been extended to the entire
mainland of Australia.29 Claiming that the “international zone” is not
under the jurisdiction of the country concerned—as President Putin
declared when confronted with the presence of whistle-blower Edward Snowden in the “international zone” of Moscow’s Sheremetyevo Airport30—governments have asserted that they are at liberty to
act without regard to refugee and other human rights obligations.
A third traditional form of non-entrée is to effect deterrence
on the high seas, an area that is in fact an international zone. In the
1990s, for example, U.S. Coast Guard ships were ordered to stop all
persons in flight from the violence and persecution that accompanied
the overthrow of the murderous Cedrás dictatorship in Haiti.31 In the
years that followed, more than 35,000 Haitians were interdicted in in26. CRUZ, supra note 19; Elspeth Guild, The Border Abroad—Visas and Border
Controls, in IN SEARCH OF EUROPE’S BORDERS 87 (Kees Groenendijk et al. eds., 2002).
27. Nicholson, supra note 19; Robert McCorquodale & Penelope Simons,
Responsibility Beyond Borders: State Responsibility for Extraterritorial Violations by
Corporations of International Human Rights Law, 70 MOD. L. REV. 598 (2007); Thomas
Gammeltoft-Hansen, Private Law Enforcement and Control, in THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JENS VEDSTED-HANSEN 517 (Gammeltoft-Hansen et al. eds., 2013).
28. Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act 2001 (Austl.);
Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act 2001
(Austl.).
29. Migration Amendment (Unauthorised Maritime Arrivals and Other Measures) Act
2013 (Austl.).
30. U.S. Whistleblower Snowden “Still in Moscow Airport,” BBC NEWS (June 26,
2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-23053915.
31. Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23, 133 (1992).
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ternational waters and returned to Haiti without having had a proper
assessment of their claims to be refugees.32 West African states were
among those that followed the American lead, forcing vessels carrying refugees away from their ports.33
Over the past two decades, however, these traditional nonentrée practices have been successfully challenged, both in practice
and as a matter of law.
First, while reliance on the combination of visa controls and
carrier sanctions remains common, this approach may now be less
capable of deterring refugees than was once the case.34 Refugees arriving in the developed world today commonly rely on organized
smuggling and other commercial modes of irregular migration.35
Smugglers have responded to visa controls and carrier sanctions by
adopting increasingly sophisticated technologies to produce travel
documents that are difficult to detect.36 They also secure access for
their clients by bribing border officials and regularly adapting travel
routes to exploit new opportunities for entry.37 The vulnerability of
the visa control and carrier sanction regime has thus given rise to an
unending “cat and mouse game” in which border control must be
constantly reinvented to respond to the schemes hatched by imaginative smugglers motivated by extraordinary profits.
Second, the notion that a state can delimit the geographical
32. Carlos Ortiz Miranda, Haiti and the United States During the 1980s and 1990s:
Refugees, Immigration, and Foreign Policy, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 673, 705 (1995);
HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 4, at 360.
33. Paul Kuruk, Asylum and the Non-Refoulement of Refugees: The Case of the
Missing Shipload of Liberian Refugees, 35 STAN. J. INT’L L. 313, 315 (1999).
34. See Ninna Nyberg Sørensen and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, Introduction, in
THE MIGRATION INDUSTRY AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION,
supra note 3, at 8; STEPHEN CASTLES & MARK J. MILLER, THE AGE OF MIGRATION:
INTERNATIONAL POPULATION MOVEMENTS IN THE MODERN WORLD 283–84 (1998).
35. See GLOBAL HUMAN SMUGGLING: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, supra note 3, at 2.
36. Marika McAdam & Sebastian Baumeister, Migrants Smuggling by Air, U.N. Office
on Drugs and Crime Issue Paper, 8–9 (2010); Ulla D. Berg & Carla Tamagno, Migration
Brokers and Document Fixers: The Making of Migrant Subjects in Urban Peru, in THE
MIGRATION INDUSTRY AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, supra
note 3, at 190.
37. See McAdam & Baumeister, supra note 36, at 13; Isabel Rosales Sandoval, Public
Officials and the Migration Industry in Guatemala: Greasing the Wheels of a Corrupt
Machine, in THE MIGRATION INDUSTRY AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION, supra note 3, at 215, 224; Jørgen Carling, Migration Control and Migrant
Fatalities at the Spanish-African Borders, 41 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 316, 327 (2007); KoLin Chin, The Social Organization of Chinese Human Smuggling, in GLOBAL HUMAN
SMUGGLING: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, supra note 3, at 186.
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scope of its territory for purposes of avoiding legal liability—for example, by excision or the declaration of an international zone in an
airport—has simply been rejected. Responding to efforts by France
to declare Orly Airport an “international zone” in which duties of
protection do not apply, the European Court of Human Rights in
Amuur concluded succinctly that “[d]espite its name, the international zone does not have extraterritorial status.”38 More recently, the
High Court of Australia struck down a law providing that persons arriving on an “excised” Australian island were precluded from accessing Australian courts and the usual procedures for assessment of refugee status.39 As these judgments make clear, both the nature of state
territory at international law and the overarching duty to meet standards of fairness wherever there is an exercise of state power means
that “international zones” are not capable of insulating a state from
its legal obligations to protect refugees under its jurisdiction.
Third, there is little support for the view that a state can deter
refugees in the international space of the high seas without violating
its duties of protection. The outlier case is the 1993 decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Sale,40 in which the Court engaged in highly formalist and decontextualized reasoning to find that
a refugee cannot be “returned” by an asylum state to her home country if she has yet to arrive in the asylum state, and that a purely territorial scope for the duty of non-refoulement is required by the language of its national security exception.41 The Court purported to
draw on the Convention’s travaux préparatoires to justify its reasoning,42 prompting the American representative to the specialist committee that drafted the Refugee Convention to reply that it would be
“incredible that states that had agreed not to force any human being
back into the hands of his or her oppressors intended to leave themselves—and each other—free to reach out beyond their territory to
seize a refugee and to return him or her to the country from which he

38. Amuur v. France, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. 523, 609 (1996).
39. Plaintiff M61 & Plaintiff M69 v. Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 41
(Austl.).
40. Sale v. Haitian Center Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
41. Id. at 179 (“The full text of Article 33 reads as follows: . . . ‘2. The benefit of the
present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable
grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who,
having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a
danger to the community of that country.’ Convention relating to the Status of Refugees,
July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 6276, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 (emphasis added).”).
42. Id. at 194–95.
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sought to escape.”43
Happily, the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach has not found
favor elsewhere. It was rejected by the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights,44 which adopted the contrary position advanced by
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in its
brief to the U.S. Supreme Court.45 The English Court of Appeal
chose to treat Sale as “wrongly decided; it certainly offends one’s
sense of fairness.”46 And in the recent case of Hirsi,47 a Grand
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights determined unanimously that push-backs on the high seas were in breach of regional
non-refoulement obligations.48 In a separate opinion, Judge Pinto de
Albuquerque pointedly observed that “the United States Supreme
Court’s interpretation contradicts the literal and ordinary meaning of
Article 33 of the U.N. Refugee Convention and departs from the
common rules of treaty interpretation.”49
In sum, the classic tools of non-entrée no longer provide developed states with an effective and legal means to avoid their obligations under refugee law.
II. COOPERATION-BASED NON-ENTRÉE: THE NEXT GENERATION
With the viability of traditional forms of non-entrée compromised, powerful states have embraced a new generation of deterrent
regimes intended to overcome many of the weaknesses of the original
generation of non-entrée practices. The new approaches are predicated on international cooperation, with deterrence occurring in the
territory, or under the jurisdiction, of the home state or a transit country. As a practical matter, new forms of non-entrée often include action in states of origin or transit designed to disrupt migrant smuggling networks, thereby stymying travel toward the frontiers of
43. Louis Henkin, Notes from the President, 5 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. NEWSLETTER 1
(1993).
44. See Haitian Center for Human Rights v. United States, Merits and Reparations,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 51/96, Case 10.675, 156–58 (1997).
45. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees in Support of Respondents, Sale v. Haitian Center Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993)
(No. 92-344).
46. R. (European Roma Rights Centre and Others) v. Immigration Officer at Prague
Airport, [2004] UKHL 55, [2005] 2 A.C. (H.L.) [34] (appeal taken from Eng.).
47. Hirsi Jamaa v. It., 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 97.
48. Id. ¶¶ 134–35.
49. Id. ¶ 66 (de Albuquerque, J., concurring).
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developed states. This geographical reorientation is also thought to
be legally instrumental. Even as international law has evolved to
make clear that liability under the non-refoulement norm ensues for
actions taken by a state at its own borders and in any other place under its jurisdiction,50 it is assumed that actions undertaken under the
jurisdiction of the authorities of other countries are legally risk-free.51
With poorer states of origin and transit often willing for economic,
political, and other reasons to serve as the gatekeepers to the developed world,52 wealthier countries believe that they can insulate themselves from liability for refugee deterrence by having such action
take place under the sovereign authority of another country.
One of the first such initiatives was undertaken by the United
States in 1997. Its Operation Global Reach provided for the ongoing
presence of U.S. immigration officers in several Central American
and Caribbean countries to work with local authorities to effect migration control operations.53 In 2001, Australia’s “Pacific Solution”
saw that country woo the island state of Nauru with offers of free
medical care, educational opportunities, and sports facilities in return
for the warehousing in Nauru of migrants intercepted by Australia.54
That deal was the genesis for outreach to other neighboring states, including Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, intended to prevent boats
carrying migrants from traveling towards Australia.55 And com50. GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, supra note 4, at 94–99; HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS
REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 4, at 160–73.

OF

51. GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, supra note 4, at 21, 126.
52. See Sandra Lavenex, Shifting Up and Out: The Foreign Policy of European
Immigration Control, 29 W. EUR. POL. 329, 330–33 (2006); Andrew Geddes, Migration as
Foreign Policy? The External Dimension of EU Action on Migration and Asylum, 2
SWEDISH INST. EUR. POL’Y STUD. 1, 16 (2009); Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, Outsourcing
Migration Management: EU, Power, and the External Dimension of Asylum and
Immigration Policy (Danish Institute for International Studies, Working Paper No. 2006/1,
2006), available at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/ ?ots591
=cab359a3-9328-19cc-a1d2-8023e646b22c&lng=en&id=18650; Elspeth Guild, What is a
Neighbour? Examining the EU Neighbourhood Policy from the Perspective of Movement of
Persons, Western NIS Forum for Refugee-Assisting NGOs, Yalta, (June 1–3, 2005);
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION & RELATIONS WITH THIRD COUNTRIES: EUROPEAN & U.S.
APPROACHES (Jan Niessen & Yongmi Schibel eds., 2004).
53. Jonathan M. Winer, Operation Global Reach News Conference, FEDERAL NEWS
SERVICE (June 19, 1997); Koslowski, supra note 3, at 65.
54. See generally Tara Magner, The Less than “Pacific” Solution for Asylum Seekers
in Australia, 16 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 53 (2004).
55. In July 2013, Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Australia signed a bilateral agreement
to process and resettle an uncapped number of asylum seekers in PNG, to be funded by
Australia but administered by PNG. As well as funding the entire arrangement, Australia
announced a suite of additional development assistance programs to the developing state.
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mencing in 2006, Spain and Italy struck deals with African countries
to carry out maritime interdiction within their territorial waters.56 Italy went so far as to promise Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi $5 billion if
he would set up radar detection facilities on his country’s shores and
work with Italy to prevent the departure from Libya of unauthorized
migrants.57
Indeed, these bilateral and ad hoc arrangements have now
spawned a series of more comprehensive arrangements. Under the
American-led Merida Initiative,58 the Bali Process co-chaired by
Australia and Indonesia,59 and the European Union’s “external dimension,”60 developed states are crafting regional platforms that embed asylum and migration questions into the mainstream of their foreign policy.
There are myriad forms of cooperation-based non-entrée,
ranging from simple diplomatic agreements to full-scale joint operations to effect migration control. We observe seven main variants,
which may be implemented separately or in tandem.

DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, GOV’T OF AUSTL., REGIONAL RESETTLEMENT
ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND PAPUA NEW GUINEA (2013); Helen Brown,
Indonesia to Change Visa Requirements for Iranians Entering the Country following
Request from PM Kevin Rudd, AUSTL. BROADCASTING CORP. (July 19, 2013),
www.abc.net.au/news/2013-07-18/indonesia-to-change-visa-requirements-foriranians/4829434.
56. See Aderanti Adepoju et al., Europe’s Migration Agreements with MigrantSending Countries in the Global South: A Critical Review, 48 INT’L MIGRATION 42, 48
(2010); PHILIPPE FARGUES & CHRISTINE FANDRICH, MIGRATION AFTER THE ARAB SPRING,
MIGRATION POLICY CENTRE RESEARCH REPORT 2012/09, at 6 (2012), available at
http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/MPC%202012%20EN%2009.pdf; MAARTEN DEN
HEIJER, EUROPE AND EXTRATERRITORIAL ASYLUM 223–27 (2012).
57. Cooperation under the treaty was halted in March of 2011 following the NATO
bombing campaign. See Human Rights Watch, Pushed Back, Pushed Around: Italy’s
Forced Return of Boat Migrants and Asylum Seekers, Libya’s Mistreatment of Migrants and
Asylum Seekers 24 (2009), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/italy0909
web_0.pdf.
58. The Merida Initiative is a multi-year agreement between the United States and
Mexico to combat drug smuggling, transnational crime, and illegal immigration. DEP’T OF
STATE, MERIDA INITIATIVE, http://www.state.gov/j/inl/merida/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
See generally THE MERIDA INITIATIVE: U.S. COUNTERDRUG AND ANTICRIME ASSISTANCE FOR
MEXICO (Isabella A. Vaughne ed., 2010).
59. Susan Kneebone, The Bali Process & Global Refugee Policy in the Asia-Pacific
Region, 27 J. REFUGEE STUD. 596, 599–610 (2014).
60. Christina Boswell, The “External Dimension” of EU Immigration and Asylum
Policy, 79 INT’L AFF. 619 (2003); see TAMPERE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT, PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS ¶¶ 15–16 (1999).
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The first and most basic new form of non-entrée relies on diplomatic relations. Both sticks (such as withholding development assistance) and carrots (including trade agreements, visa facilitation,
and labor immigration quotas) may be provided to states of origin or
transit willing to assist in the deterrence of outward migration. The
European Union has been especially active in promoting this approach, seeking to negotiate agreements with key Mediterranean and
Eastern European states to combat “irregular” migration,61 including
by the establishment or intensification of exit controls.62 States under
consideration for accession to the European Union are moreover required to meet detailed migration control standards set by the European Commission as a condition to move forward in the process of
securing actual membership in the Union.63
A second new approach to non-entrée is to move beyond diplomatic cooperation to provide partner states of origin and transit
with direct financial incentives to take on migration control responsibilities deemed of value. Under the Mérida Initiative, for example,
the United States has since 2008 appropriated some $2.1 billion to
combat drug smuggling and improve border control in Mexico and
Central America.64 Part of this funding has been used to purchase
equipment, including helicopters and x-ray scanners,65 as well as to
open new immigration control sites at the border between Mexico
and Guatemala.66 Similarly, in 2003 Spain agreed to provide Morocco with $390 million in aid and debt relief in return for Moroccan
border control efforts.67 In 2009, Italy pledged $5 billion to Libya
61. Aderanti Adepoju et al., Europe’s Migration Agreements with Migrant-Sending
Countries in the Global South: A Critical Review, 48 INT’L MIGRATION 42, 43 (2010); see
Derek Lutterbeck, Policing Migration in the Mediterranean, 11 MEDITERRANEAN POL. 59,
71 (2006). See generally Ivaylo Gatev, Border Security in the Eastern Neighbourhood:
Where Biopolitics and Geopolitics Meet, 13 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 97 (2008).
62. Adepoju, supra note 61, at 68.
63. Requirements placed on acceding states before the 2004 enlargement in some
respects exceeded the obligations placed on existing Member States. See NEW ASYLUM
COUNTRIES? MIGRATION CONTROL AND REFUGEE PROTECTION IN AN ENLARGED EUROPEAN
UNION (Rosemary Byrne et al. eds., 2002).
64. DEP’T OF STATE, MERIDA INITIATIVE, supra note 58. See generally CLARE RIBANDO
SEELKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40135, MÉRIDA INITIATIVE FOR MEXICO AND CENTRAL
AMERICA: FUNDING AND POLICY ISSUES (2009); COLLEEN W. COOK, REBECCA G. RUSH &
CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22837, MÉRIDA INITIATIVE: PROPOSED
U.S. ANTICRIME AND COUNTERDRUG ASSISTANCE FOR MEXICO AND CENTRAL AMERICA
(2008).
65. SEELKE, supra note 64, at 4.
66. Id. at 11.
67. As a result of this cooperation, Moroccan gendarmes opened fire on migrants
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over a twenty-year period in exchange for Libya agreeing to take
back intercepted refugees and other migrants and to undertake patrols
intended to prevent migration towards Europe.68
Beyond offering financial incentives, a third variant of the
new non-entrée is direct provision of equipment, machinery, and
training to the authorities of the cooperating country. Italy and other
E.U. countries provided Libya with border control equipment, including radars, night vision goggles, and patrol boats.69 European-funded
security companies have provided document scanners and thermoimaging equipment to facilitate immigration control along the border
between Russia and the Ukraine.70 Australia and Indonesia established a joint center to improve border control and law enforcement
capability in Jakarta in 2004.71 Australia also trains Sri Lankan naval
officers and has gifted patrol boats and other border control equipment to the country.72 In 2010, Mexican officials were invited to the
United States for a ten-week training program on profiling techniques
and the detection of false documents.73
trying to climb the border-fence to the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla, killing eleven
and wounding many others in September 2005. See Thomas Spijkerboer, The Human Cost
of Border Control, 9 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 127 (2007); Press Release, European
Commission, Visit to Ceuta and Melilla—Mission Report (Oct. 19, 2005), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-05-380_en.htm?locale=en; Six Killed Near
Spain’s Enclave, BBC NEWS (Oct. 6, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4316702.stm.
68. See Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation, It.-Libya, Aug. 30, 2008,
150 GU 89 (entered into force Mar. 2, 2009); Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, The
Externalisation of European Migration Control and the Reach of International Refugee Law,
in THE FIRST DECADE OF EU MIGRATION AND ASYLUM LAW 273, 273 (Paul Minderhoud &
Elspeth Guild eds., 2011).
69. See Martin Lemberg-Pedersen, Private Security Companies and the European
Borderscapes, in THE MIGRATION INDUSTRY AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, supra note 3, at 152; Derek Lutterbeck, Migrants, Weapons and
Oil: Europe and Libya After the Sanctions, 14 J. N. AFR. STUD. 169, 175, 177 (2009).
70. Gatev, supra note 61, at 97–116.
71. See David Connery, Natalie Sambhi & Michael McKenzie, A Return on
Investment: The Future of Police Cooperation between Australia and Indonesia, AUSTL.
STRATEGIC
POL’Y
INST.
(2014),
available
at
https://www.aspi.org.au/
publications/a-return-on-investment-the-future-of-police-cooperation-between-australia-andindonesia/SR67_Australia_Indon_police_coop.pdf; see also Jakarta Centre for Law
Enforcement Cooperation, About JCLEC (May 12, 2005) http://www.jclec.com/
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14&Itemid=28.
72. Human Rights Law Centre, Can’t Flee, Can’t Stay: Australia’s Interception and
Return of Sri Lankan Asylum Seekers 25 (2014), available at http://www.hrlc.org.au/wpcontent/uploads/2014/03/HRLC_SriLanka_Report_11March2014.pdf.
73. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, DHS, ICE and Mexico Honor Graduates of Mexican Customs Investigator
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A fourth form of collaborative deterrence is actually to deploy
or second immigration officials of the destination country to work
with authorities in the country of origin or transit. For example, the
United States maintains immigration officers in forty-eight foreign
countries.74 Australia began posting Airline Liason Officers (ALOs)
in Bangkok in 1990,75 and by 2013 had an ALO network of fifteen
offices.76 In 2004, the European Union established a network of immigration officers drawn from member states to be posted at airports
and border crossing points in key states of origin and transit.77 While
both Australia and the European Union are at pains to emphasize that
their immigration officers “do not carry out any tasks relating to the
sovereignty of States,”78 in practice the “advice” or support of their
officers is often decisive for decisions regarding onward travel.79
Fifth, a program of joint or shared enforcement may be established between the destination country and partner states of origin
and/or transit. U.S. immigration officers carried out joint operations
with Mexican authorities,80 leading to some 74,000 apprehensions of
Training Program (Oct. 22, 2010), available at www.ice.gov/news/releases/1010/
101022northcharleston2.htm.
See generally Marc R. Rosenblum, Obstacles and
Opportunities for Regional Cooperation: The US-Mexico Case, MIGRATION POL’Y INST.
(2011).
74. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
Overview, http://www.ice.gov/about/overview/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2015). See generally
Eleanor Taylor-Nicholson, Cutting Off the Flow: Extraterritorial Controls to Prevent
Migration, Berkeley L. Issues Brief (2011), available at http://eucenter.berkeley.edu/
files/Issue_Brief_2011_Final.pdf.
75. Savitri Taylor, Offshore Barriers to Asylum Seeker Movement: The Exercise of
Power Without Responsibility?, in FORCED MIGRATION, HUMAN RIGHTS & SECURITY 93, 95
(Jane McAdam ed., 2008).
76. Id. at 95–96; DEP’T OF IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP, GOV’T OF AUSTL., ANN. REP.
2012–13, 302 (2013), available at http://www.immi.gov.au/about/reports/annual/201213/pdf/2012-13-diac-annual-report.pdf; see Leanne Weber, Policing the Virtual Border:
Punitive Preemption in Australian Offshore Migration Control, 34 SOC. JUST. 77, 84–85
(2007) (on the role of ALOs).
77. Council Reg. (EC) No 377/2004 (Feb. 19, 2004) (addressing the creation of an
immigration liaison network).
78. Council Notice, Proposal for a Comprehensive Plan to Combat Illegal Immigration
and Trafficking of Human Beings in the European Union, 2002 O.J. (C 142) 23, 31; see
DEP’T IMMIGR. & BORDER PROTECTION, GOV’T OF AUSTL., COMBATING PEOPLE SMUGGLING
AND UNAUTHORISED ARRIVALS (Dec. 16, 2013).
79. Taylor, supra note 75, at 103; see McCorquodale & Simons, supra note 27, at 67.
80. See Matthew Coleman, A Geopolitics of Engagement: Neoliberalism, the War on
Terrorism, and the Reconfiguration of US Immigration Enforcement, 12 GEOPOLITICS 607,
620 (2007).
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U.S.-bound immigrants between 1997 and 2001.81 Australian officials fund and work closely with their Sri Lankan counterparts to foil
human smuggling efforts in the hope of deterring onward movement
towards Australia.82 Since 2010, border guards of twenty-four European Union states have been deployed to the border between Greece
and Turkey to prevent entry into Greece,83 and thus into the Union’s
territory. Spain has brought Senegalese and Mauritanian immigration officers onboard vessels engaged in interception of outbound
migrants from the territorial waters of those states.84 Such “shiprider agreements” have also been entered into between Italy and Albania,85 and between the United States and the Dominican Repub81. Id.
82. AUSTL. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION SERVICES, Attorney-General’s Meeting
with His Excellency Admiral Thisara Samarasinghe (2013), www.customs.gov.au/
webdata/resources/files/2013-003135_DocumentsReleased.pdf; Press Release, Austl. High
Commission in Sri Lanka, Sri Lankan Convicted of People Smuggling, (Sep. 14, 2011); Phil
Lynch, Sri Lanka, Human Rights and Foreign Policy in a Tweet, THE DRUM (AUSTL. BROAD.
CORP.) (July 21, 2011), available at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-07-21/lynch--twitter2c-sri-lanka2c-human-rights-and-australian-for/2803978; Ben Doherty, Sri Lanka to
Make More Arrests: More Sailors Linked to People Smuggling Ring, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD (Nov. 16, 2013), available at http://www.smh.com.au/national/sri-lanka-to-makemore-arrests-more-sailors-linked-to-people-smuggling-ring-20131115-2xmdd.html;
Tony
Abbott Confirms Bay-Class Patrol Boats Gift to Sri Lanka to Combat People Smuggling,
AUSTL. BROAD. CORP. (Nov. 17, 2013, 3:41 AM), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-1117/abbott-confirms-sri-lanka-boats-deal/5097580. In December 2012, the first Sri LankaAustralia Joint Working Group on People Smuggling and Transnational Crime was
convened. See AUSTL. DEP’T OF IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP, ANN. REP. 2012–13, 10
(2013),
http://www.immi.gov.au/
about/reports/annual/2012-13/pdf/2012-13-diac-annual-report.pdf.
83. Establishing a Mechanism for the Creation of Rapid Border 78 Intervention
Teams, Reg. (EC) No 863, (July 11, 2007); Sergio Carrera & Elspeth Guild, “Joint
Operation RABIT 2010”—FRONTEX Assistance to Greece’s Border with Turkey:
Revealing the Deficiencies of Europe’s Dublin Asylum System, CTR. EUR. POL’Y STUD. (Nov.
22, 2010), http://aei.pitt.edu/15186/1/No_34_Carrera_&_Guild_on_RABIT_2010.pdf.
84. Longest Frontex-Coordinated Operation—HERA, the Canary Islands, FRONTEX
(Dec. 19, 2006), http://frontex.europa.eu/news/longest-frontex-coordinated-operation-herathe-canary-islands-WpQlsc; Sergio Carrera, The E.U. Border Management Strategy:
FRONTEX and the Challenges of Irregular Immigration in the Canary Islands 21 (CEPS
Working Document, No. 261, 2007), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/7385/1/1482.pdf; Jorrit
J. Rijpma, Building Borders: The Regulatory Framework for the Management of the
External Border of the European Union 341–42 (2009) (Ph.D. dissertation, European Univ.
Inst.) (on file with authors); see DOUGLAS GUILFOYLE, SHIPPING INTERDICTION & THE LAW
OF THE SEA 219 (2009).
85. Protocol Between Italy and Albania to Prevent Certain Illegal Acts and Render
Humanitarian Assistance to Those Leaving Albania, GAZZETTA UFFICIALE DELLA
REPUBBLICA ITALIANA NO. 163 (July 15, 1997); see GUILFOYLE, supra note 84, at 210.
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lic.86
In a sixth and still more intrusive form of non-entrée, the destination country may actually take on a direct migration control role
from within the territory of the cooperating state. In 2001, the United
Kingdom introduced a pre-clearance procedure at Prague Airport under which British immigration officers stationed there had the authority to grant or refuse leave to enter the United Kingdom before boarding.87 As was made clear in evidence considered by the House of
Lords, a significant number of Roma seeking recognition of their refugee status were in fact deterred by this procedure.88 Agreements
have also been signed to allow third country authorities onboard European ships to carry out interceptions inside the territorial waters of
such states as Libya, Mauritania, and Senegal.89 While relevant European Union guidelines make express reference to the importance of
respect for the duty of non-refoulement,90 interdicted persons have in
practice often been returned without any assessment of their protection needs.91
Finally, we are now seeing the emergence of a seventh approach to non-entrée in which international agencies are tasked by
developed states with the responsibility to intercept refugees and other would-be migrants while they are still under the jurisdiction of
countries of origin and of transit. The European Union border agency, Frontex, has traditionally served as an umbrella organization to
enable member states to carry out joint operations at the external
borders of the Union and internationally.92 The agency has, however,
86. Agreement Concerning Cooperation in Maritime Migration Law Enforcement,
U.S.-Dom. Rep., May 20, 2003, T.I.A.S No. 03-520; see GUILFOYLE, supra note 84, at 196.
87. See R. (European Roma Rights Centre and Others) v. Immigration Officer at
Prague Airport, 2004 Court of Appeal, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 666, rev’d. on other grounds at
[2004] UKHL 55; see also Andrew Brouwer & Judith Kumin, Interception and Asylum:
When Migration Control and Human Rights Collide, 21 REFUGE 6, 11 (2003).
88. R. (European Roma Rights Centre and Others) v. Immigration Officer at Prague
Airport, [2004] UKHL 55, [2005] 2 A.C. 1 (H.L.) [34], ¶¶ 4, 92 (appeal taken from Eng.).
89. GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, supra note 4, at 126; GUILFOYLE, supra note 84, at 218;
Rijpma, supra note 84.
90. Council Regulation 1168/2011, (EC), amending Council Regulation 2007/2004,
(EC) arts. 1, 3(b), establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, 2004 O.J.
(L349/1).
91. GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, supra note 4, at 126; GUILFOYLE, supra note 84, at 218.
92. Council Regulation 2007/2004, (EC), Establishing a European Agency for the
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of
the European Union, 2004 O.J. (L349/1).
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since been authorized to deploy its own immigration officers to third
states, as well as to “initiate and carry out joint operations.”93 While
the agency’s mandate requires it to respect duties under the Refugee
Convention, in particular the duty of non-refoulement,94 it is doubtful
that as a matter of international law the agency itself can be said to be
truly bound by any international human rights instrument.95 As such,
the shift in the Frontex mandate raises the specter of a legally unaccountable entity deterring refugee and other migration in foreign
space.
To be clear, the seven variants of cooperation-based nonentrée identified here are in no sense hermetically sealed options.
For example, the Libyan-Italian interdiction scheme included not only financial incentives, but also comprised direct provision of border
control equipment and joint enforcement operations in Libyan territorial waters.96
The truly pernicious nature of these new forms of non-entrée
is especially clear when the cooperation is with countries not themselves legally bound to protect refugees. Neither Libya nor Indonesia, for example, is a party to the Refugee Convention.97 And even
when formally bound by refugee law, many of the favored partner
states have no national procedure in place to assess refugee status nor
the de facto capacity to or will to ensure respect for refugee rights.98
93. Council Regulation 1168/2011, supra note 90.
94. See id. art. 1(2).
95. International refugee law, and most general human rights law, is addressed
exclusively to states. Adjudicatory jurisdiction over international organizations thus cannot
be established. See Behrami v. France, App. No. 71412/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007); see also
Saramati v. France, App. No. 78166/01 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007). The planned accession of the
European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights may partly remedy this
situation.
96. Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, The Externalisation of European Migration Control
and the Reach of International Refugee Law, in THE FIRST DECADE OF EU MIGRATION AND
ASYLUM LAW 273, 293–95 (Paul Minderhoud & Elspeth Guild eds., 2011).
97. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, State Parties to the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol (Apr. 1, 2011),
http://www.unhcr.org/3b73b0d63.html.
98. For example, while Libya is not a party to the U.N. Refugee Convention, it is
bound by the 1969 Organization of African Unity Refugee Convention, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention Against Torture; the nonrefoulement principle is moreover formally incorporated in its national law. See Law of the
General People’s Congress of 1991 (Law No. 20/1991), art. 2 (Libya). Despite these
commitments, Libya has yet to implement a functional asylum system and has a track record
of abuse, detention, and forced return of refugees. See AMNESTY INT’L, SEEKING SAFETY,
FINDING FEAR: REFUGEE, ASYLUM-SEEKERS AND MIGRANTS IN LIBYA AND MALTA 12 (2010);
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As such, refugees trapped under the jurisdiction of these states have
little or no ability to claim the rights to which they are in principle
entitled by international law.
The question to which we now turn is whether the assumptions upon which this new generation of cooperative non-entrée
mechanisms is based are legally sound. Specifically, we argue that
the bedrock principle of public international law that state responsibility follows from jurisdiction can no longer be narrowly understood. While primarily territorial in nature, jurisdiction today can also be established in some situations in which control is taken over
persons outside of a state’s territory, as well as in some circumstances in which a state exercises public powers outside of its territory.
Nor is it the case that only one state can have jurisdiction in a given
factual context. To the contrary, principles of shared responsibility
provide a critical means by which to hold sponsoring states accountable for many forms of joint or collective conduct at the heart of the
new generation of non-entrée. And even where there is no jurisdiction—particularized or shared—a more robust understanding of liability for aiding or assisting another country to breach international
law is evolving that we believe has the potential to fill at least some
of the accountability void that non-entrée policies seek to exploit.
Taken together, developments in relation to jurisdiction, shared responsibility, and liability for aiding and assisting call into question
the legality of many, if not all, of the new, international cooperationbased deterrent regimes.
III. JURISDICTION IN EVOLUTION
Unlike most other human rights instruments, the rights contained in the 1951 Refugee Convention are not granted en bloc, but
rather incrementally, requiring states gradually to extend more generous rights as the degree of attachment between the refugee and host
state increases.99 While the majority of rights are explicitly reserved
for refugees who are physically present in the territory or who have
some higher level of attachment to the host state, a few core rights—
including the duty of non-refoulement—are intentionally said to ap-

Human Rights Watch, Pushed Back, Pushed Around, supra note 57, at 48.
99. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 4,
at 161–63. The notion of “levels of attachment” was adopted by the U.K. Supreme Court in
R. (ST (Eritrea)) v. Secretary of State for the Home Dept., [2012] UKSC 12, ¶¶ 21–23
(appeal taken from Eng.).
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ply without territorial or other qualification.100 The plain language of
the Convention thus makes clear that this critical group of baseline
rights is not acquired only when a refugee reaches a state party’s territory101 —this being the requirement to qualify for rights that are acquired at the second level of attachment (“in” or “within” a contracting state’s territory). While at no time did the drafters suggest that
state parties were responsible to effectuate refugee rights in the world
at large, neither did they purport to exempt states that choose to act
beyond their territory from responsibility for the consequences of
such actions. In view of this ambiguity—plain language makes clear
that some refugee rights are not limited to refugees physically present
in a state party’s territory, yet neither are state parties compelled by
the treaty to implement rights in the world at large—rules of treaty
interpretation compel the adoption of an understanding of the first,
ambiguously-framed level of attachment that is in line with the context, object, and purpose of the Refugee Convention.102
These considerations lead us to seek guidance in the approach
taken by international human rights law—expressly part of the Convention’s context by virtue of its Preamble,103 and an appropriate
touchstone in view of the holdings of leading courts that the object
and purpose of refugee law is to provide for the surrogate or substitute protection of human rights.104 Under international human rights
100. In addition to article 33’s protection against refoulement, these rights include nondiscrimination (article 3), property (article 13), access to the courts (article 16(1)), the right
to benefit from rationing schemes (article 20), education (article 22), fiscal equality (article
29), and the ability to apply for a durable status (article 34). HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF
REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 4, at 160–71.
101. As noted by the House of Lords, “the starting point of the construction exercise
must be the text of the Convention itself . . . because it expresses what the parties to it have
agreed.” Januzi v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2006] UKHL 5, [2006] 2
A.C. 426 (per Lord Bingham); see Saadi v. U.K., 47 Eur. Ct. H.R. 17, ¶¶ 61–62 (2008);
Golder v. U.K., 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 29 (1975).
102. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 25, art. 33(3). As noted
by the International Court of Justice, “interpretation cannot remain unaffected by subsequent
development of law . . . an international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within
the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation.”
Namibia (South West Africa) Case, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 31 (June 21).
103. See, e.g., Suresh v. Canada, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, ¶ 72 (Can.); HATHAWAY, THE
RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 4, at 64.
104. This understanding has been widely adopted: See, e.g., Minister for Immigration
and Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar, [2002] 210 CLR 1 (Austl.); Ward v. Canada (Attorney
General), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 733 (Can.); Msengi v. Minister for Justice, Equality, Law
Reform, [2006] I.E.H.C. 241 (H. Ct.) (Ir.); Re MN, Appeal No. 2039/93, ¶¶ 38–40 (N.Z.
R.S.A.A., 1996); Horvath v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2000] UKHL 37,
[2001] 1 A.C. 489, 495 (appeal taken from Eng.). For a more complete list of the many
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law, the usual baseline position105 is that rights are owed to anyone
“within” or “subject to” a state’s jurisdiction.106 Adopting the same
approach for acquisition of the most basic refugee rights (that is,
those that are not qualified by references to physical presence or otherwise)—including, of course, the duty of non-refoulement—is thus
contextually logical as well as purposively sound, a fact recognized
by soft law107 and confirmed by dominant state practice.108
In one of the clearest statements of the meaning of jurisdiction in international human rights law, the U.N. Human Rights
Committee determined that the obligation under the Civil and Political Covenant to respect rights “within [a state’s] territory and . . .
subject to [its] jurisdiction . . . means . . . a [state] must respect and
ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the
power or effective control of the [state], even if not situated within

appellate courts that have embraced this understanding, see generally HATHAWAY & FOSTER,
supra note 4, at 185 n.18.
105. The four Geneva Conventions are exceptional, expressly obligating state parties “to
respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.” Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 1, Aug. 12,
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (emphasis added).
106. See Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 2 § 1, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S.
3; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 22 § 1, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 112; American Convention on Human
Rights: “Pact of San José, Costa Rica” art. 1 § 1, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143;
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2 § 1, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171; European Convention on Human Rights art. 1, Sep. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222; see also
GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, supra note 4, at 81−93; HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 4, at 64−66.
107. See, e.g., United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Executive Committee
Conclusions: Conclusion on Protection Safeguards in Interception Measures: Conclusion
No. 97 (LIV), ¶ a (Oct. 10, 2003), http://www.unhcr.org/3f93b2894.html; United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, Executive Committee Conclusions: General Conclusion
on International Protection: Conclusion No. 74 (XLV), ¶ g (Oct. 7, 1994), http://www.un
hcr.org/3ae68c6a4.html.
108. GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, supra note 4, at 72−81; HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF
REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 4, at 68−74. The U.S. government
represents a notable exception to this position and maintains that article 33 of the 1951
Refugee Convention applies strictly territorially. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Observations of
the United States on the Advisory Opinion of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees on
the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol (Dec. 28, 2007), available at
http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/l/2007/112631.htm; see also Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen,
Extraterritorial Migration Control and the Reach of Human Rights, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK
ON
INTERNATIONAL
LAW
&
MIGRATION
113,
116
n. 14 (Vincent Chetail & Céline Bauloz eds., 2014) .
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the territory of the [state].”109 This approach was affirmed as accurate by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the seminal Israeli
Wall decision, which insisted that “the drafters of the Covenant did
not intend to allow States to escape from their obligations when they
exercise jurisdiction outside their national territory.”110
Some confusion was, however, sewn by the decision of the
European Court of Human Rights in Bankovic.111 Invoking general
principles of international law112 to interpret the scope of jurisdiction
for purposes of entitlement to human rights protection, the Court determined that extensions beyond territorial jurisdiction113 are “exceptional and requir[e] special justification in the particular circumstances of each case.”114 Finding no such special justification to exist in
regard to the bombing of Yugoslavia by NATO states, the Court
ruled that the states conducting the bombing had no jurisdiction over
the civilians killed, and thus did not breach the European Convention
despite effecting their deaths.
In recent years, however, the open-ended language about the
meaning of jurisdiction adopted in the Bankovic decision has been
built upon in a way that brings European regional human rights law
to a position on the meaning of jurisdiction that is substantially in
line with that adopted by the U.N. Human Rights Committee and affirmed by the ICJ. As the critical 2011 ruling in Al-Skeini makes
109. U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31 [80], The Nature of the
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, ¶ 10 (Mar. 29, 2004).
110. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131, ¶ 109 (July 9); see Armed Activities of the
Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 216 (Dec. 19)
(finding that international human rights law is “applicable ‘in respect of acts done by a State
in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory’”) (quoting Legal Consequences,
2004 I.C.J. at ¶ 107−13).
111. Bankovic v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333.
112. Id. ¶ 59. As a matter of public international law, a state’s jurisdiction normally
denotes its entitlement to prescribe and enforce its domestic laws, and the notion of
jurisdiction has therefore—at least in regard to enforcement—traditionally been linked to
state territory. Vaughan Lowe & Christopher Staker, Jurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
335, 338 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2nd ed. 2006); Bruno Simma & Andreas Th. Müller,
Exercise and Limits of Jurisdiction, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
134, 135 (James Crawford & Martti Koskenniemi eds., 2012).
113. As pointed out by the ICJ, “while the jurisdiction of States is primarily territorial, it
may sometimes be exercised outside the national territory.” Legal Consequences, 2004
I.C.J., ¶ 109.
114. Bankovic, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 61. This has since been reiterated in several
judgments. See, e.g., Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. 589, ¶ 131 (2011).
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clear, while the concept of jurisdiction remains in evolution, states
today exercise human rights jurisdiction beyond their territory in an
increasing number of situations.115
The first such situation is where a state exercises effective
control over some or all of the territory of another country, most notably by way of military occupation.116 The jurisdictional obligations
of the occupying state stem from de facto control alone117—
lawfulness is not required.118 What matters is that the state is adjudged to exercise overall control of a defined territory for some period of time, and to the exclusion of the territorial state.119 For example, the ICJ held in its Wall opinion that Israel’s human rights
obligations apply to “all conduct by the State party’s authorities or
agents in [the occupied] territories that affect the enjoyment of rights
. . . and fall within the ambit of State responsibility of Israel under the
principles of public international law.”120 Much the same result was
reached by the European Court of Human Rights in Cyprus v. Turkey, finding that responsibility followed not simply because relevant
actions had been taken by government agents, but more generally
from the fact of a relevant act or omission having taken place within
an area of effective control.121
This first, control-based extension of the notion of the traditional territorial view of jurisdiction is likely of little immediate value
in contesting the new generation of cooperation-based non-entrée

115. Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 132.
116. Bankovic, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 71. For other cases involving effective control
over territory, see Legal Consequences, 2004 I.C.J., ¶¶ 102–14; Loizidou v. Turkey, 1996VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2216; Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Report No. 109/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 6 rev. (1999); Salas v. United States, Case No.
10.573, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 31/93, OEA/Ser.L/V.85, doc. 9 rev. (1993).
117. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2009).

OF
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118. As is also the case under the Fourth Geneva Convention, the lawfulness of such
military operations is in principle irrelevant to the obligations imposed on the occupying
power. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 97, ¶
73 (noting that “responsibility of a Contracting Party may also arise when as a consequence
of military action—whether lawful or unlawful—it exercises effective control of an area
outside its national territory”).
119. DINSTEIN, supra note 117, at 38.
120. Legal Consequences, 2004 I.C.J., ¶ 110 (quoting U.N. High Commissioner for
Human Rights, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel.
05/08/2003, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR (Aug. 5, 2003)).
121. Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, ¶ 77.
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practices. Not only has the case law thus far focused only on obligations arising from military occupation, but to date there is no instance
of non-entrée having been implemented by way of the transfer of durable and exclusive control over territory.122 In contrast, we see real
potential in two other developments in the law of jurisdiction: jurisdiction based on the exercise of authority over individuals, for example by way of arrest or detention; and jurisdiction established by the
exercise abroad of public powers abroad as a matter of treaty or other
agreement.
A. Jurisdiction Based on Authority over Individuals
Short of exercising territorial control, “a State may also be
held accountable for violation of . . . rights and freedoms of persons
who are in the territory of another State but who are found to be under the former State’s authority and control through its agents operating—whether lawfully or unlawfully—in the latter State.”123 States
have, for example, been found to have jurisdiction over individuals
within their embassy or consulate, or who are onboard craft or vessels registered in their country, or which are flying their flag.124 It is
also acknowledged that a state has jurisdiction over individuals held
on its military bases, detention centers, or other closed facilities controlled by the extraterritorially acting state.125
122. The closest approximation may be the agreement under which the United Kingdom
is allowed to enforce its national immigration law within designated areas of the French
ports of Dunkirk, Boulogne, and Calais. At the international level, the juxtaposed control
scheme is provided for by the Touquet treaty, which was signed on February 4, 2003 and
was given domestic effect by the Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Act 2002
(Juxtaposed Controls) Order 2003. Similar control arrangements have been made to give
access to United Kingdom immigration officers to perform migration control at Eurostar
stations in France and Belgium. See The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002
(Juxtaposed Controls), 2003, Order 2003 No. 2818 (U.K.); Treaty Concerning the
Implementation of Frontier Controls at the Sea Ports of Both Countries on the Channel and
North Sea, Le Touquet, U.K.-Fr., Feb. 4, 2003, 42 U.N.T.S. 2290.
123. Issa v. Turkey, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 567, ¶ 71 (2005).
124. Medvedyev v. France, 2010-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 61, ¶ 65; Bankovic v. Belgium, 2001XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, ¶ 73. See generally M. v. Denmark, App. No. 17392/90, Eur.
Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. (1992); W. v. Ireland, App. No. 9360/81, 32 Eur. Comm’n. H.R.
Dec. & Rep. 211, 215 (1983); X v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7547/76, Eur. Comm’n H.R.
Dec. & Rep. 73 (1977); X. v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 1611/62, Eur.
Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 158, 168 (1965); Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, 2011 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 40, ¶ 8.2; Al-Saadoon v. United Kingdom, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. 61, ¶ 19.
125. See Al-Saadoon, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 19; see also Al-Skeini v. Sec’y of State for
Def., [2007] UKHL 26, [2008] 1 A.C. 153, ¶ 25 (appeal taken from Eng.); Hess v. United
Kingdom, App. No. 6231/73, 2 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 72 (1975).
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Such findings are, at one level, unsurprising: they simply
mirror the traditional approach in public international law to the
scope of enforcement jurisdiction. But the European Court of Human Rights has gone farther, finding human rights jurisdiction to be
established even by the simple act of boarding a migrant vessel, the
emphasis being placed in such cases on the de facto control exercised
over the individuals concerned.126 This focus on the exercise of control as a means of establishing human rights jurisdiction can perhaps
be seen most clearly in cases involving state agents forcibly apprehending and transporting an individual to their state’s territory.127
Courts have emphasized that the logic of finding jurisdiction in such
a situation is the importance of stymying the evasion of obligations,
since it would be “unconscionable . . . to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of [human rights] in the territory of another State,
which violations it could not perpetrate within its own territory.”128
Thus, as observed in Al-Skeini, jurisdiction may arise solely from
“the exercise of physical power and control over the person in question.”129
Applying this understanding of jurisdiction to the context of
non-entrée policies, jurisdiction is established when refugees are intercepted and their movements controlled by state agents acting outside their country.130 A Grand Chamber of the European Court of
Human Rights ruled in Hirsi that Italy had jurisdiction over migrants
turned back on the high seas under the auspices of its cooperation
agreement with Libya and that characterizing such interception as a

126. Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. 589, ¶ 136 (2011); Medvedyev v.
France, 2010-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 61, ¶ 65.
127. See, e.g., Ramirez v. France, App. No. 28780/95, 86-B Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 155, 162 (1996); Reinette v. France, App. No. 14009/88, 63 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 189, ¶ 2 (1989); Freda v. Italy, App. No. 8916/80, 21 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
250, 256 (1980); Öcalan v. Turkey, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 282, ¶ 93; Stocke v. Germany, 53
Eur. Ct. H.R. 166, 199 (1991); Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, Human Rights
Committee, No. 56/1979, at 92, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1984), available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/html/56_1979.htm; Burgos v. Uruguay, Human
Rights Committee, No. R.12/52, at 176, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40) (1981), available
at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/session36/12-52.htm.
128. Burgos, No. R.12/52, ¶ 12.3; see also Issa, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 71.
129. Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 136. Most cases to date have involved situations of
full physical custody by way of arrest or kidnapping. In Al-Saadoon, for example, the Court
emphasized “the total and exclusive” control exercised by the United Kingdom over the
military bases in Iraq. Al-Saadoon, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 88.
130. See, e.g., Ramirez, App. No. 28780/95, at 162; Öcalan, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R.;
Celiberti de Casariego, No. 56/1979; Burgos, No. R.12/52.
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“rescue operation[] on the high seas”131 was legally irrelevant:
The Court observes that in the instant case the events
took place entirely on board ships of the Italian armed
forces, the crews of which were composed exclusively
of Italian military personnel. In the Court’s opinion,
in the period between boarding the ships of the Italian
armed forces and being handed over to the Libyan authorities, the applicants were under the continuous and
exclusive de jure and de facto control of the Italian authorities. Speculation as to the nature and purpose of
the intervention of the Italian ships on the high seas
would not lead the Court to any other conclusion.132
Given the lack of protection for refugees in Libya and the risk
of persecution in the applicants’ countries of origin (Eritrea and Somalia), the Court found Italy in breach of its human rights obligations, including the duty of non-refoulement.133
Indeed, jurisdiction may continue where interception leads to
the transfer of refugee claimants to a detention or similar facility located outside the territory of the intercepting state.134 In the Marine I
case,135 the Committee Against Torture was called upon to consider
Spain’s human rights liability stemming from the rescue of some 369
Asians and Africans in waters off the West African coast. After
boarding the Marine I to provide emergency health care, Spanish authorities towed the vessel to the Mauritanian port of Nouadhibou
where the passengers were disembarked and placed at a former fishing plant under Spanish authority. Most were repatriated, though
twenty-three persons who resisted repatriation remained at the fishing
plant guarded by Spanish security forces for five months under conditions alleged to be rights-violative.136 The Committee Against Torture concluded that Spain exercised jurisdiction both during the interception and throughout the detention in Mauritania, noting that:
[J]urisdiction must also include situations where a
State party exercises, directly or indirectly, de facto or
de jure control over persons in detention . . . . In the
131. Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 97, ¶ 79.
132. Id. ¶ 81.
133. Id. ¶¶ 122−38, 146−58, 183−86.
134. Al-Saadoon, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 88.
135. J.H.A. v. Spain, Judgments U.N. Committee Against Torture, No. 323/2007, U.N.
Doc. CAT/C/41/D/323/2007 (2008).
136. Ten of the twenty-three were eventually granted access to Spain and Portugal and
the final thirteen returned to Pakistan. Id.
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present case, . . . the State party maintained control
over the persons on board the Marine I from the time
the vessel was rescued and throughout the identification and repatriation process that took place at Nouadhibou. In particular, the State party exercised, by virtue of a diplomatic agreement concluded with
Mauritania, constant de facto control over the alleged
victims during their detention in Nouadhibou. Consequently, the Committee considers that the alleged victims are subject to Spanish jurisdiction insofar as the
complaint that forms the subject of the present communication is concerned.137
Beyond its value as a clear affirmation that an intercepting
state retains jurisdiction even when its control over persons is exercised on the territory of another country, the Marine I case makes a
more general point that jurisdiction can be established under the control or authority principle where detention is effected on an indirect
basis:
[T]he jurisdiction of a State party refers to any territory in which it exercises, directly or indirectly, in
whole or in part, de jure or de facto effective control,
in accordance with international law. In particular . . .
such jurisdiction must also include situations where a
State party exercises, directly or indirectly, de facto or
de jure control over persons in detention.138
It follows that a country exercises jurisdiction over refugees
when its vessels block or “escort” a ship carrying refugees, since
those refugees are indirectly detained (that is, “confine[d] within a
narrowly bounded or restricted location”).139 At least where the
blocking or escorting is more than momentary—as will be the case
for reasons of efficacy in most non-entrée scenarios—there is little
doubt that control over the human beings onboard is as real in such
cases as it is when freedom of movement is constrained by the act of
137. Id. ¶ 8.2. However, the case was declared inadmissible because the complainant
was not expressly authorized to act on behalf of the victims.
138. Id.
139. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR’s Revised Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers, Guideline 1
(Feb. 26, 1999), available at http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?
docid=3c2b3f844. These guidelines were replaced by U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Detention Guidelines: Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards Relating
to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to Detention (2012), available at
http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=503489533b8.
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actually boarding.140 Indeed, in Xhavara, the European Court of
Human Rights found human rights jurisdiction to exist when an Italian navy ship seeking to deter migrants on the high seas collided with
another vessel, leading to fifty-eight deaths141—a poignant example
of the salience of the Committee Against Torture’s insistence that
“indirect” control may be just as effective as direct control.142
In sum, it is clear that territorial control—while sufficient—is
no longer required to establish human rights jurisdiction. Jurisdiction
also exists where refugees are intercepted and their movements controlled by state agents acting outside of their country’s territory, including when those agents continue to exercise control over them in a
detention facility in another country. There is also human rights jurisdiction where extraterritorial control is indirect, as in the cases of
blockades and the forcible escort of vessels carrying asylum seekers
on the high seas. In each of these ways, the modern understanding of
human rights jurisdiction is clearly a powerful means to challenge the
common assumption underlying non-entrée policies that core refugee
protection responsibilities apply rarely, if ever, outside their own territory.
B. Exercise of Public Powers
Jurisdiction will most readily be established on the basis of either territorial or personal control. As explained in the preceding
subsection, the personal control jurisprudence is an especially valuable means of challenging some critical forms of cooperation-based
non-entrée under which the role of the extraterritorial state in interdiction or enforcement can be characterized as amounting to de facto
control over the refugees themselves. But what if the degree of control exercised by the sponsoring state falls short of what is required to

140. Similarly, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights determined that the
shooting down of an aircraft in international airspace near Cuba’s borders was sufficient to
trigger Cuba’s human rights jurisdiction. Alejandre v. Cuba, Case 11.589, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 86/99, OAE/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 25 (1997).
141. See Xhavara v. Italy, App. No. 39473/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001).
142. Indeed, a number of recent cases suggest that human rights jurisdiction may be
established even when there is no evidence of ongoing direct or indirect control. Contrary to
the view taken in Bankovic, recent decisions suggest that human rights jurisdiction may be
established on the basis of the effects of rights-violative conduct lacking any element of
durable control. Bankovic v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, ¶ 73. See, e.g., Andreou
v. Turkey, App. No. 45653/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009); Solomou v. Turkey, App. No.
36832/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008); Pad v. Turkey, App. No. 60167/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007);
Isaak v. Turkey, App. No. 44587/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006).
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establish jurisdiction under the personal control approach? In particular, what if non-entrée is implemented by proxy, for example where
the sponsoring state deploys officials to work with authorities in a
country of origin or transit to advise them on how best to block refugee departures?
Recent case law suggests that in addition to the territorial and
personal control bases for establishing jurisdiction, states may also be
found to have jurisdiction where they exercise public powers abroad.
In Al-Skeini, the key question was whether the United Kingdom had
jurisdiction over civilians killed in the course of security operations
by British soldiers in Basrah.143 Rather than determining the issue of
responsibility simply by reference to either territorial or personal
control, the European Court of Human Rights instead observed that:
[T]he Court has recognised the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by a Contracting State when,
through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the
Government of that territory, it exercises all or some
of the public powers normally to be exercised by that
Government . . . . Thus where, in accordance with
custom, treaty or other agreement, authorities of the
Contracting State carry out executive or judicial functions on the territory of another State, the Contracting
State may be responsible for breaches of [international
law] thereby incurred, as long as the acts in question
are attributable to it rather than to the territorial
State.144
In other words, where states are entitled to exercise public powers
abroad, jurisdiction for human rights purposes will follow under certain circumstances.145 Three requirements must be met.
First, the legal authority of the extraterritorial state to act must
be established in “accordance with custom, treaty or other agreement.”146 Excluded therefore are situations such as an unlawful invasion in which public powers are effectively usurped by the foreign
state. This constraint is, however, unlikely to be of any real moment
in relation to cooperation-based non-entrée policies, routinely implemented through interstate arrangements. Because some “other
143. Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. 589, ¶¶ 102, 130–50 (2011).
144. Id. ¶ 135.
145. The European Court of Human Rights has recently affirmed the “public powers”
approach to jurisdiction as adumbrated in Al-Skeini. Jaloud v. Netherlands, 2014 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 1292, ¶ 145.
146. Id. ¶ 139 (quoting Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 135).
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agreement” falling short of custom or treaty suffices, even relatively
informal agreements—memoranda of understanding, an exchange of
letters—are enough to show the requisite consent. Indeed, even the
absence of an effective government in the territorial state with which
agreement may be reached is not necessarily fatal, since the facts of
Al-Skeini itself suggest that the legal basis for the exercise of public
powers may be derived from international legal authorization, for example in the form of a U.N. resolution.147
Second, the activities undertaken must be fairly characterized
as a “public power[] normally to be exercised by that Government.”148 The notion of public power is not well-defined in international law, and may thus give rise to disagreement in some cases.
But since the court in Al-Skeini made clear that “public powers” include not just security or civil administration, but also executive and
judicial functions,149 there can be little doubt that the exercise of migration control—being a core law enforcement task and exclusive
sovereign prerogative—constitutes a public power.150
Third, the breach of human rights resulting from the exercise
of public powers must be attributable to the extraterritorially acting
state, rather than to the territorial state.151 The real link required is, of
course, readily established where the sponsoring state has actually
deployed officers or vessels engaged directly in enforcement. But
under general principles of international law, conduct is also attributable to a sponsoring state where private actors or third state authorities act under the direction and control of the sponsoring state,152 or

147. Id. ¶ 144.
148. Id. ¶ 139 (quoting Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 135).
149. Id. ¶¶ 139, 143−48 (quoting Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 130−39).
150. As Emmerich de Vattel notes in The Law of Nations, every sovereign nation retains
the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the
entrance of foreigners within its dominions or to admit them only in such cases or upon such
conditions as it may see fit to prescribe. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, bk. 2,
§§ 94, 100 (1883). This is fully consistent with current state practice. See, e.g., Sale v.
Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 199 (1993); R. (European Roma Rights Centre and
Others) v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport, [2004] UKHL 55, [2005] 2 A.C. 1, ¶ 45
(appeal taken from Eng.).
151. Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 135.
152. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27); Int’l Law Comm’n, Articles on the Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 8, 17, U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No.
10 (2001). For a general discussion of the relevant test for attributing non-state and third
state conduct, see JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL PART 126−32,
146−61 (2013).
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where effective control is retained over officials otherwise carrying
out migration control as part of an international organization.153
Given the consonance between the three requirements for jurisdiction based on the exercise of public powers and the nature of
many cooperation-based non-entrée practices, this emerging line of
jurisprudence is an important addition to the more established approaches grounded in territorial or personal control. Even where
there is no territorial or personal control, the fact that the sponsoring
state can be said to exercise migration control functions beyond its
borders—an increasingly common phenomenon—will often suffice
to establish jurisdiction despite formal assertions to the contrary.
Under E.U. law, for example, the RABIT (“rapid border intervention teams”) Regulation posits that any responsibility stemming from joint operations rests solely with the Member State hosting the operation.154 Yet in substance, the Regulation undoubtedly
establishes a clear entitlement of officials of E.U. states seconded to
Frontex to exercise public powers in that they not only work in their
national uniforms, but “shall have the capacity to perform all tasks
and exercise all powers for border checks or border surveillance” in
line with the Schengen Borders Code.155 Although formally required
to patrol only in the company of an officer of the host country and to
act only on the instructions of the host state, Frontex officers deployed to Greece have, in practice, independently carried out patrols
and intercepted and interviewed refugees and other migrants.156 Despite Greece’s theoretical responsibility to decide the issue of return
or admission to an asylum procedure, there is little doubt that in practice the dysfunctional Greek asylum system—determined by both the
European Court of Human Rights and European Court of Justice to
fall below even minimal international standards of efficacy157—relies
153. See Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1092, ¶ 80; Int’l Law
Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations, art. 7, U.N.
Doc. A/66/10; GAOR, 63th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2011); CRAWFORD, supra note 152 at
422−34.
154. Council Regulation 863/2007, Establishing a Mechanism for the Creation of Rapid
Border Intervention Teams, art. 10, 2007 O.J. (L 199/30) (EC).
155. Id. art. 6 § 1.
156. Human Rights Watch, The EU’s Dirty Hands: Frontex Involvement in IllTreatment of Migrant Detainees in Greece 38−46 (2011), http://www.hrw.org/sites/
default/files/reports/greece0911webwcover_0.pdf.
157. See M.S.S. v. Belgium, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R 108; Joined Cases C-411/10 & C493/10, N.S. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t & M.E. v. Refugee Applications Comm’r,
2011 E.C.R I-13991, available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?
text=&docid=117187&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&%20mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=
1&cid=43817; see also Human Rights Watch, The EU’s Dirty Hands, supra note 156, at
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significantly on the efforts of officials from other E.U. states. In these circumstances, the public powers approach to jurisdiction affords a
sound basis to argue that these other states may exercise jurisdiction
by their deterrent actions, and should therefore be held accountable
for any breach of refugee or other international law following from
that exercise of public powers.
To be clear, we do not argue that liability for a breach of human rights law ought to hinge exclusively on the permissibility of a
state’s actions.158 But it is important not to conflate this argument
with the view that the exercise of public powers should be seen as an
additional basis to find jurisdiction (beyond territory and personal
authority). Our argument is in no way that human rights responsibility should be limited by formal notions of sovereignty, but rather that
legal entitlement to act extraterritorially as a matter of public international law fairly defines a (not “the”) circumstance in which jurisdiction exists, and that accountability for human rights violations is enhanced by acknowledging this additional basis to hold states
responsible for breach of relevant norms.
The continued alignment of human rights law and public in-

38−46. In June 2014, the Committee of Ministers decided to continue supervision of Greece
based on a finding that the asylum system is still not fully compliant with the European
Convention of Human Rights. Comm. of Ministers, Case Against Belgium and Greece,
1201st Meeting (June 5, 2014), available at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CM/Del/
OJ/DH(2014)1201/4&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&Site=CM&BackColorInternet=
DBDCF2&BackColorIntranet=FDC864&BackColorLogged=FDC864.
158. It is well-established that extraterritorial jurisdiction may be triggered solely based
on the degree of de facto control. See e.g., Burgos v. Uruguay, Human Rights Committee,
No. R.12/52, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40) (1981), available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/session36/12-52.htm (including the separate opinion
by Christian Tomuschat); Öcalan v. Turkey, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 282; see also HEIJER,
supra note 56, at 33. Milanovic has championed the view that “consent or the sovereignty of
the territorial state more generally should be entirely irrelevant for the issue of
extraterritorial application [of human rights].” Marko Milanovic, Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda in
Strasbourg, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 132 (2012). Or, as Scheinin puts it, facticity creates
normativity. Martin Scheinin, Extraterritorial Effect of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, in EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 73,
75–77 (Fons Coomans & Menno T. Kamminga eds., 2004).
We suspect that the
antagonism towards reliance on a public powers approach to jurisdiction stems less from its
substance than from the fact that it is a notion grounded in public international law more
generally. In the aftermath of what many scholars understandably believed to be the wrongheaded approach to jurisdiction taken in Bankovic—an approach allegedly grounded in
public international law—we see an unhealthy willingness to throw the proverbial baby out
with the bathwater. Put simply, it does not follow that, because Bankovic was arguably an
incorrect decision on jurisdiction grounded in public international law, any approach to
jurisdiction grounded in public international law should be regarded with skepticism.
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ternational law more generally on the issue of jurisdiction is, in our
view, not only doctrinally sound—international human rights law is,
after all, a subset of public international law159—but is also strategically wise: the interaction between the two bodies of law has often
been quite positive,160 affirming for example that jurisdiction may
flow from either de facto or de jure control.161 The human rights
value of the public powers approach to jurisdiction is clear not only
from the result in Al-Skeini162 itself, but also, for example, from such
decisions as X and Y v. Switzerland,163 in which an immigrant denied
entry into Liechtenstein was held to be subject to Swiss jurisdiction
because Switzerland legislated on immigration matters for both territories and J.H.A. v. Spain, in which Spain was found to have retained
jurisdiction during the period the migrants were detained in Nouadhibou “by virtue of a diplomatic agreement concluded with Mauritania.”164
We thus believe that reliance on the public powers approach
159. While there was at one time confusion regarding the relationship between the two
bodies of law, the “integrationist” view—holding that international human rights law is a
subset of public international law—is now generally acknowledged to be correct. See, e.g.,
COMM. ON INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS LAW & PRACTICE, 72ND CONFERENCE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, RIO DE JANEIRO: FINAL REPORT ON THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2008);
THE IMPACT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW ON GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW (Menno T.
Kamminga & Martin Scheinin eds., 2009); Committee on International Human Rights Law
and Practice, International Law Association, Resolution No. 4/2008 (2008); Alain Pellet,
“Human Rightism” and International Law, 10 IT. Y.B. INT’L L. 3 (2000); Bruno Simma,
International Human Rights and General International Law: A Comparative Analysis, in 4
COLLECTED COURSES ACAD. EUR. L., bk. 2, at 153 (1995).
160. See Hugh King, The Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations of States, 9 HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 521 (2009); Loukis Loucaides, Determining the Extra-territorial Effect of the
European Convention: Facts, Jurisprudence and the Bankovic Case, 4 EUR. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 391, 393–94 (2006).
161. See Medvedyev v. France, 2010-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 61, ¶ 65; Bankovic v. Belgium,
2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, ¶ 73; J.H.A. v. Spain, Judgments U.N. Committee Against
Torture, ¶ 8.2, No. 323/2007, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/41/D/323/2007 (2008). The Inter-American
Commission for Human Rights has similarly distinguished between “jurisdiction” and “de
facto jurisdiction.” See Alejandre v. Cuba, Case 11.589, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report
No. 86/99, OAE/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 23 n.14 (1997) (citing Theodor Meron,
Extraterritoriality of Human Rights Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 78, 81 (1995)); see also
Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 97, ¶ 80 (citing Medvedyev, 2010-III Eur. Ct.
H.R.).
162. Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R 589 (2011).
163. X & Y v. Switzerland, App. No. 7289/75 & No. 7349/76, 9 Eur. Comm’n H.R.
Dec. Rep. 57 (1977).
164. J.H.A., No. 323/2007, ¶ 8.2.
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to the definition of an additional basis of jurisdiction has the potential to serve as an important tool in the fight against cooperative variants of non-entrée, allowing liability to be imposed in a number of
circumstances that arguably fall outside either the territorial or the
personal mode of jurisdiction. Where there is an agreement to deploy
liaison officers or provide other forms of support that in substance result in the exercise of effective control by the sponsoring state, jurisdiction—and hence liability—is established.
IV. SHARED RESPONSIBILITY
To this point we have established that responsibility for refoulement follows from jurisdiction and that jurisdiction can be established when states exercise effective control over territory, authority
over individuals, or public powers under international law. But what
of the situation in which more than one state can be said to have jurisdiction and hence incur human rights responsibility? Effective
control over territory is normally exclusive, but neither authority over
individuals nor the exercise of public powers necessarily preempts
the simultaneous jurisdiction of a territorial or cooperating state. Can
the state acting extraterritorially be held to exercise jurisdiction in the
case of such non-exclusivity?
The traditional view in human rights law was that jurisdiction
was an all or nothing proposition.165 Since jurisdiction was the basis
for responsibility, it followed that shared responsibility for the breach
of human rights obligations would be implausible. Under this classic
approach, the developments in the law of jurisdiction set out in Part
III would have had little practical value in contesting cooperationbased forms of non-entrée, as the jurisdiction of the territorial state
would ordinarily have been thought to trump a more diffuse form of
jurisdiction.166
Modern understandings of jurisdiction under human rights
law have, however, largely rejected this “all or nothing” view and
come more closely into line with the dominant position in public international law that two or more states responsible for the same internationally wrongful act can both be held individually liable on the
basis of their own conduct and international obligations.167 In other
165. Hess v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6231/73, 2 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 72
(1975) (The European Commission refused to single out the responsibility of the United
Kingdom as one of the four powers exercising authority over the Spandau Prison in Berlin.).
166. GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, supra note 4, at 145–49.
167. See Articles on the Responsibility of States, supra note 152, at art. 47; CRAWFORD,
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words, the fact that several states have jurisdiction does not diminish
the individual responsibility of any particular state.168 This bedrock
principle of public international law can be seen, for example, in the
reasoning of the ICJ in the Certain Phosphate Lands case.169 The
Court there rejected the Australian argument that a finding of individuated liability against it was foreclosed by the fact that its trusteeship of Nauru was shared with New Zealand and the United Kingdom:
Australia has raised the question whether the liability
of the three States would be “joint and several” (solidaire), so that any one of the three would be liable to
make full reparation for damage flowing from any
breach of the obligations of the Administering Authority, and not merely a one-third or some other proportionate share. This . . . is independent of the question
whether Australia can be sued alone. The Court does
not consider that any reason has been shown why a
claim brought against only one of the three States
should be declared inadmissible in limine litis merely
because that claim raises questions of the administration of the Territory, which was shared with two other
supra note 152, at 325−28, 333−34; André Nollkaemper & Dov Jacobs, Shared
Responsibility in International Law: A Concept Paper 15 (Univ. of Amsterdam SHARES
Series,
ACIL
Research
Paper
No.
2011-07,
2011),
available
at
http://www.sharesproject.nl/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Nollkaemper-Jacobs-SharedResponsibility-in-International-Law-A-Concept-Paper.pdf. There are limited historical
examples of two or more states sharing territorial jurisdiction, such as condominiums or
trusteeships. See e.g., CRAWFORD, supra note 152, at 325−28; André Nollkaemper, Issues of
Shared Responsibility Before the International Court of Justice (Univ. of Amsterdam
SHARES Series, ACIL Research Paper No. 2011-01, 2011), available at
http://www.sharesproject.nl/publication/issues-of-shared-responsibility-before-the-europeancourt-of-human-rights; James Turpin, The Jurisdictional Art of Separation: The Role of
Jurisdiction in the Management of Territorial and Self-determination Disputes: Mixed
Jurisdiction in the Anglo-French Condominium of the New Hebrides 1906−1980, (2002)
(Ph.D. dissertation, European Univ. Inst.) (on file with author).
168. See Articles on the Responsibility of States, supra note 152, art. 47(1); CRAWFORD,
supra note 152, at 334–35. See generally GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, supra note 4, at 100−208;
Frank Berman, Jurisdiction: The State, in ASSERTING JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND
EUROPEAN LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 3 (Patrick Capps et al. eds., 2003); Richard T. Ford, Law’s
Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REV. 843 (1999); Lowe & Staker, supra
note 112, at 335−60; John Gerard Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing
Modernity in International Relations, 47 INT’L ORG. 139, 151 (1993).
169. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), Preliminary Objections, 1992
I.C.J. 240, 261−62 (June 26); see also East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 104−05
(June 30); Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 36 (April 9).
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States. It cannot be denied that Australia had obligations under the Trusteeship Agreement, in its capacity
as one of the three States forming the Administering
Authority, and there is nothing in the character of that
Agreement which debars the Court from considering a
claim of a breach of those obligations by Australia.170
In line with this approach, the human rights cases Al-Skeini
and Hirsi expressly rejected an “all or nothing” approach, finding
that “rights can be ‘divided and tailored.’”171 Thus, for example, in
Ilascu, the European Court of Human Rights held that both Moldova
and Russia had exercised jurisdiction—Russia due to its decisive influence over the local Transnistrian regime, Moldova through its de
jure sovereignty over the area—and held that simultaneous yet differentiated human rights responsibility followed.172 Most recently,
the Court rejected the view that the Netherlands had no jurisdiction
over a command checkpoint in Iraq manned by its troops simply because the United Kingdom—as a formal occupying power—might
also have jurisdiction there. To the contrary, the Court found in
Jaloud that a party “is not divested of its ‘jurisdiction’ . . . solely by
dint of having accepted the operational control of . . . a United Kingdom officer.”173 The same principle has been found to apply where
distinct actions by more than one state result in a common harm, as is
clear from the ruling in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece determining
that Belgium was in breach for returning the applicant to Greece contrary to the duty of non-refoulement, even as it found that Greece was
itself liable for the failure to establish adequate asylum procedures
and to avoid the ill-treatment of those seeking its protection.174
Importantly, particularized liability may ensue even when not
all of the states exercising jurisdiction are bound by the same international legal obligations. In Al-Skeini, the United Kingdom was held
responsible under the European Convention on Human Rights even
though it shared its jurisdiction in Iraq with the United States and
other non-party states making up the Coalition Provisional Authority
following the removal of the Ba’ath regime.175 Similarly, the active

170. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, 1992 I.C.J., ¶ 48.
171. Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. 589, ¶ 137 (2011); Hirsi Jamaa v.
Italy, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 97, ¶ 74.
172. Ilaşcu v. Moldova, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 179, ¶¶ 376−94; see also Drozd v.
France, 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. 745, ¶¶ 91–96 (1992).
173. Jaloud v. Netherlands, 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1292, ¶ 143.
174. M.S.S. v. Belgium, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R 108.
175. Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 144−50.
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assistance of Kenyan authorities in the arrest of the PKK leader in
Nairobi was considered in Öcalan, yet this did not detract from a
finding of Turkish jurisdiction for purposes of the European Convention once Turkish authorities took him into custody.176 Under this
reasoning, the fact that a partner state is not a party to the Refugee
Convention (as is frequently the case under cooperation-based forms
of non-entrée) is no bar to finding the sponsoring state party exercising jurisdiction to be liable.
Nor does it matter whether shared jurisdiction exists directly
among the states in question or is achieved by the delegation of authority to an agency or organ.177 In T.I. v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights determined that:
[W]here States establish international organisations, or
mutatis mutandis international agreements, to pursue
co-operation in certain fields of activities, there may
be implications for the protection of fundamental
rights. It would be incompatible with the purpose and
object of the Convention if Contracting States were
thereby absolved from their responsibility under the
Convention in relation to the field of activity covered
by such attribution.178
Because legal liability is not avoided when authority is delegated to an international organization,179 patrols conducted under the
auspices of such entities as the European Union’s Frontex agency
may still engage the liability of each participating state whose officials or agents have taken part in an action that gives rise to jurisdiction, and which leads to refoulement or another human rights breach.
As much is impliedly recognized by the regulation defining the authority of Frontex, which provides that “[t]he responsibility for the
control and surveillance of external borders lies with the Member
176. Öcalan v. Turkey, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 282, ¶ 93.
177. Articles on the Responsibility of States, supra note 152, art. 47, cmt. 125. This is
corroborated by the ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations,
see Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations, supra note 153, arts.
58−62, cmts. 89−90.
178. T.I. v. United Kingdom, 2000-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 435 (admissibility).
179. See Şirketi v. Ireland, 2005-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 107; Beer v. Germany, 1999-I Eur. Ct.
H.R. 6; Matthews v. United Kingdom, 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 251, ¶ 32; see also DAN
SAROOSHI, INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND THEIR EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGN POWER 64
(2007); OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: CASES, MATERIALS,
COMMENTARY 216−38 (2010). State responsibility for acts committed by states acting
under the authority of the U.N. Security Council remains a special case. See generally
Behrami v. France, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 85 (2007).
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States.”180
In sum, evolution of the notion of shared jurisdiction allowing
more than one state to be held liable for a given breach of human
rights as a function of its own actions, whatever the liability of other
states, is an important bulwark against cooperation-based forms of
non-entrée that purport to leave partner states holding the ball for the
refoulement of refugees. As the European Court of Human Rights
noted succinctly in Xhavara, the “Italian-Albanian Agreement cannot, by itself, engage the responsibility of [Albania] under the Convention for any action taken by Italian authorities in the implementation of this agreement.”181
V. AIDING OR ASSISTING
To this point we have shown that many contemporary nonentrée practices can be successfully challenged by reliance on developments in the law of jurisdiction, especially when coupled with an
appreciation that shared responsibility in law may exist where more
than one state has jurisdiction in a given context. But, what of the
situation where the involvement of the sponsoring state falls short of
establishing jurisdiction, even under one of the expanded notions of
jurisdiction described in Part III?182 For example, states are clearly
not exercising jurisdiction when they provide only training or material assistance to a partner state. Even when immigration officers or
180. Council Regulation 2007/2004, Establishing a European Agency for the
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of
the European Union, ¶ 4, 2004 O.J. (L349) 1 (EC).
181. Xhavara v. Italy, App. No. 39473/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001). The European Court of
Human Rights further considered the impact of bilateral agreements in Al-Saadoon, in which
the United Kingdom argued that since United Kingdom forces operated in Iraq subject to a
memorandum of understanding establishing Iraqi overall jurisdiction, the United Kingdom
was under a legal obligation to transfer the applicants over to the Iraqi authorities despite a
known risk that this might subject the applicants to the death penalty. Recalling the Soering
principle that such a transfer would constitute refoulement, the Court held that “a
Contracting Party is responsible under Article 1 of the Convention for all acts and omissions
of its organs regardless of whether the act or omission in question was a consequence of
domestic law or of the necessity to comply with international legal obligations. Article 1
makes no distinction as to the type of rule or measure concerned and does not exclude any
part of the Contracting Party’s ‘jurisdiction’ from scrutiny under the Convention.” AlSaadoon v. United Kingdom, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. 61, ¶ 128.
182. We use the term “shared responsibility” in this paper to indicate a situation in
which more than one state has simultaneous jurisdiction. We note, however, that the term as
employed by others may also include aiding or assisting of the kind considered in this
section. See e.g., Nollkaemper & Jacobs, supra note 167.
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other officials are posted to another country as advisers, there will be
no exercise of jurisdiction unless the authorities of the territorial state
can be shown to act under the direction and control of the sponsoring
state.
Because there is no jurisdiction, does it follow that the sponsoring country bears no legal responsibility for ensuing harms? Perhaps not. There is an emerging consensus that international law will
hold states responsible for aiding or assisting another state’s wrongful conduct.183 This understanding is most clearly set out in Article
16 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility:
A State which aids or assists another State in the
commission of an internationally wrongful act by the
latter is internationally responsible for doing so if: (a)
That State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and (b)
The act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State.184
The ILC Articles are not, of course, formally binding. Article
16 has, however, garnered wide support as a matter of state practice
and opinio juris.185 In the Bosnian Genocide case, the ICJ drew on
183. See, e.g., HELMUT PHILIPP AUST, COMPLICITY AND THE LAW OF STATE
RESPONSIBILITY (2013); CRAWFORD, supra note 152; Jillian Button, Spirited Away (Into a
Legal Black Hole?): The Challenge of Invoking State Responsibility for Extraordinary
Rendition, 19 FLA. J. INT’L L. 531 (2007); Mark Gibney, Katarina Tomaševski & Jens
Vedsted-Hansen, Transnational State Responsibility for Violations of Human Rights, 12
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 267 (1999); Vaughan Lowe, Responsibility for the Conduct of Other
States, 101 J. INT’L L. & DIPLOMACY 1 (2002); Georg Nolte & Helmut Philipp Aust,
Equivocal Helpers—Complicit States, Mixed Messages and International Law, 58 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 1 (2009); John Quigley, Complicity in International Law: A New Direction in
the Law of State Responsibility, 1986 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 77.
184. Articles on the Responsibility of States, supra note 152, art. 16. Earlier drafts of
the ILC Articles equally referred to “complicity” and “accessory” responsibility, but “aid
and assistance” was eventually chosen as a more neutral-sounding term. Nolte & Aust,
supra note 183. As Milanovic has pointed out, “aid and assistance” may perhaps best be
thought of as a particular kind of complicity, involving a degree of material assistance
beyond mere instigation. Marko Milanovic, State Responsibility for Genocide: A FollowUp, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 669, 682 (2007). See generally AUST, supra note 183, at 100−03.
185. See AUST, supra note 183, at 107−91 (a recent attempt to provide an overview in
this area). As Aust concludes, “[t]he number of positive statements available allows us to
ascribe the necessary opinio juris to the elements of practice we have assembled to a degree
that is seldom found in international law . . . . [N]ot only can we point towards a significant
amount of practice here, but we can underline its legal significance with the amount of
support Article 16 ASR has found in the deliberations of States in the United Nations.” Id.
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Article 16, noting that it considered the article to be an expression of
customary international law.186 The Venice Commission of the
Council of Europe similarly referred to Article 16 as applicable to
European states contributing to instances of refoulement and other
human rights abuses in the context of the U.S.-led extraordinary rendition program,187 as did Judge Albuquerque in his separate opinion
to the Hirsi case.188 This approach is very much in line with the general view of the European Court of Human Rights that international
human rights law is to be interpreted taking into account the law on
state responsibility:
[P]rinciples underlying the Convention cannot be interpreted and applied in a vacuum. The Court must
also take into account any relevant rules of international law when examining questions concerning its
jurisdiction and, consequently, determine State responsibility in conformity with the governing principles of international law.189
Article 16 regrettably does not tell us specifically what counts
as aiding or assisting another state to breach its international legal obligations. The commentary notes that the assistance need not be essential to performing the illegal act, so long as it contributes significantly thereto190—suggesting at the very least that action beyond
at 186; see Jean D’Aspremont, Rebellion and State Responsibility: Wrongdoing by
Democratically Elected Insurgents, 58 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 427, 432 (2009); Nolte & Aust,
supra note 183, at 7–10; Quigley, supra note 183, at 77−97. Other scholars have remained
more cautious, see for example, Lowe, supra note 183.
186. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb.), 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶ 420 (Feb. 26) [hereinafter Genocide
Case].
187. European Commission for Democracy Through the Law (Venice Commission), On
the International Legal Obligations of Council of Europe Members States in Respect of
Secret Detention Facilities and Inter-State Transport Of Prisoners, ¶¶ 44–45, Op. No.
363/2005, CDL-AD(2006)009, (2006), available at http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/
documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD%282006%29009-e.
188. Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 97, ¶ 97 (separate opinion by Judge
Pinto de Albuqerque).
189. Bankovic v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, ¶ 57. Indeed, Article 6 of the
ILC Articles on State Responsibility was applied in Jaloud to determine questions of
attribution between the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Jaloud v. Netherlands, 2014
Eur. Ct. H.R. 1292, ¶ 151. Similarly, the Court has applied Article 5 of the parallel Draft
Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations in Al-Jedda to determine the
question of attribution between the United Kingdom and the United Nations. Al-Jedda v.
United Kingdom, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 40, ¶ 84.
190. Articles on the Responsibility of States, supra note 152.
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mere instigation is required.191 But state responsibility does arise
where a state provides “material aid to a State that uses the aid to
commit human rights violations.”192 The ICJ thus sensibly determined in the Bosnian Genocide case that the supply of weapons,
military equipment and financial resources amounted to “aid and assistance” by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the army of Republika Srpska.193
In line with these understandings, we believe that a state
which takes steps such as providing maritime patrol vessels or border
control equipment, which seconds border officials, or which shares
relevant intelligence or directly funds migration control efforts that
assist another country to breach its non-refoulement or other protection obligations is taking action that can fairly be characterized as
within the ambit of aiding or assisting. We would distinguish such
actions from, for example, merely applying diplomatic pressure to introduce or enforce exit migration controls or to sign readmission
agreements which—while undoubtedly creating a climate within
which rights breaches may occur—may simply be too remote from
such harms to be deemed aiding or assisting the commission of a
wrongful act.194 Nor do we believe that a pure act of omission, for
example, failing to step in to prevent an instance of refoulement by
another state, rises to the level of aiding or assisting that country to
breach its obligations.195
Even where the state sponsoring non-entrée takes more direct
forms of action, Article 16 provides that the assisting state must have
“knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful
act.”196 Indeed, the commentary goes further, suggesting both an intention and a consummation requirement, namely that aid or assistance must be given “with a view to facilitating the [internationally]
wrongful act, and must actually do so.”197 It follows that liability
191. AUST, supra note 183, at 209; CRAWFORD, supra note 152, at 403; Milanovic,
supra note 184, at 682.
192. Articles on the Responsibility of States, supra note 152, art. 16, ¶ 9.
193. Genocide Case, supra note 186, ¶¶ 239−41, 422. This is equally supported by state
practice. Articles on the Responsibility of States, supra note 152, art. 16, ¶ 7; see also Nolte
& Aust, supra note 183, at 7−8.
194. See, e.g., NEW ASYLUM COUNTRIES?, supra note 63, at 16.
195. Genocide Case, supra note 186, ¶¶ 222–23; CRAWFORD, supra note 152, at
403−05.
196. Articles on the Responsibility of States, supra note 152, art. 16.
197. Id. art. 16, ¶ 5. The interpretation of this requirement has been an issue of some
contestation both within and outside the ILC. On the one hand, it could be taken to imply
that the assisting state must share the wrongful intent of the principal state, effectively
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should not follow where aid or assistance given in good faith is subsequently misused by another country—for example, a state providing development aid is not responsible if, unbeknownst to it, that aid
is used to implement border controls that lead to the refoulement of
refugees.
It is otherwise, however, where the sponsoring state has at
least constructive knowledge that its contributions will aid or assist
another country to breach its obligations and chooses to aid or assist
notwithstanding such constructive knowledge. For example, in Hirsi,
Italy argued that it reasonably considered Libya to be a “safe host
country” based on its ratification of several human rights treaties and
the African Union’s regional refugee treaty, coupled with the express
stipulation in the Italian-Libyan agreement requiring Libya to comply
with international human rights law.198 Relying on these formal
commitments, Italy argued that it “had no reason to believe that Libya would evade its commitments.”199 This argument was, however,
soundly rejected by the Court:
[T]he Court is bound to observe that the existence of
domestic laws and the ratification of international
treaties guaranteeing respect for fundamental rights
are not in themselves sufficient to ensure adequate
protection against the risk of ill-treatment where, as in
the present case, reliable sources have reported practices resorted to or tolerated by the authorities . . . .
The Court notes again that [this] situation was well
narrowing the scope of application. AUST, supra note 183, at 230–49; Milanovic, supra note
184, at 682−84; Nolte & Aust, supra note 183, at 14–15. The International Court of Justice
raised this question in the Genocide Case, but ultimately left it unanswered: “Before the
Court turns to an examination of the facts, one further comment is required. It concerns the
link between the specific intent (dolus specialis) which characterizes the crime of genocide
and the motives which inspire the actions of an accomplice (meaning a person providing aid
or assistance to the direct perpetrators of the crime): the question arises whether complicity
presupposes that the accomplice shares the specific intent (dolus specialis) of the principal
perpetrator. But whatever the reply to this question, there is no doubt that the conduct of an
organ or a person furnishing aid or assistance to a perpetrator of the crime of genocide
cannot be treated as complicity in genocide unless at the least that organ or person acted
knowingly, that is to say, in particular, was aware of the specific intent (dolus specialis) of
the principal perpetrator. If that condition is not fulfilled, that is sufficient to exclude
categorization as complicity. The Court will thus first consider whether this latter condition
is met in the present case. It is only if it replies to that question of fact in the affirmative that
it will need to determine the legal point referred to above.” Genocide Case, supra note 186,
¶ 421.
198. Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 97, ¶ 97.
199. Id. ¶ 98.
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known and easy to verify on the basis of multiple
sources. It therefore considers that when the applicants were removed, the Italian authorities knew or
should have known that, as irregular migrants, they
would be exposed in Libya to treatment in breach of
the Convention and that they would not be given any
kind of protection in that country.200
The Court’s approach aligns neatly with the general refusal of courts
to countenance willful blindness to readily ascertainable facts.201
Beyond the requirement of knowledge, liability for aiding or
assisting can be imposed only where the act “would be internationally wrongful” if committed by both the principal state actor and the
state said to be aiding or assisting that country.202 The starting point
is therefore to ascertain that the conduct in question is in breach of an
international obligation of the principal state—not a minor matter
when, as is often the case, non-entrée cooperation is undertaken with
a state that is not bound by the Refugee Convention or Protocol, including such key partner states as Libya, Indonesia, and Malaysia.203
Some would no doubt locate the required unlawfulness in the alleged
existence of a customary legal duty of non-refoulement.204 In our
view, the better approach would be to draw on Crawford’s view that
Article 16(b) “merely requires that the conduct in question would
have been internationally wrongful if committed by the assisting state
and says nothing about the identity of norms or sources”205—thus
opening the possibility of liability for aiding or assisting where the
act in question is unlawful for both the principal and sponsoring
states, albeit on the basis of distinct legal norms.206 Many partner
200. Id. ¶¶ 128, 131.
201. See, e.g., AUST, supra note 183, at 244−49; IAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF
NATIONS: STATE RESPONSIBILITY, PART I 12 (1983). This would align the knowledge
requirement for complicity with that ordinarily applied in the context of non-refoulement.
But see CRAWFORD, supra note 152, at 406.
202. This is a reflection of the pacta tertii principle that no state is bound by the
obligations of another state vis-à-vis third states. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties arts. 34−35, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 18232.
203. Cf. Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, The Externalisation of European Migration
Control and the Reach of International Refugee Law, in THE FIRST DECADE OF EU
MIGRATION AND ASYLUM LAW 273 (Elspeth Guild & Paul Minderhoud eds., 2012).
204. But see Hathaway, Leveraging Asylum, supra note 4 (arguing that the relatively
consistent state practice required for a customary norm of non-refoulement to come into
being does not in fact exist).
205. CRAWFORD, supra note 152, at 410.
206. Notably, the International Court of Justice, when considering that Article 16 could
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states not bound by the Refugee Convention or Protocol are nonetheless parties to other human rights instruments that contain a cognate
duty of non-refoulement (though the scope of same may not in all
cases be identical)207—thus providing the required basis for a finding
of international wrongfulness. For example, Libya and Indonesia
have both ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (which has been interpreted to impose a duty of nonrefoulement at least in cases involving risk of the breach of Articles 6
and 7)208 as well as the Convention Against Torture (which proscribes return to torture in Article 3).209 Indeed, it may even be that it
would be “internationally wrongful” for a partner state to breach the
terms of an international non-entrée cooperation agreements—which
often condition such cooperation on respect for refugee and other
rights.
The scope of the duty not to aid or assist another country to
breach international law is not yet as fully developed in international
human rights law as are the evolutions in regard to both jurisdiction
and shared responsibility described in Parts III and IV. There is
nonetheless little doubt that a general rule of state responsibility for
complicity or “aiding and assisting” is now accepted as a matter of
principle even as its contours await full elucidation.210 States that believe that the more diffuse forms of non-entrée involving no exercise
of jurisdiction are thus necessarily immune from legal liability are
thus proceeding with false confidence.
CONCLUSION
We have argued here that developed states have what might
charitably be called a schizophrenic attitude towards international
refugee law. On the one hand, wealthier states no longer garner the
be applied analogously to state complicity under the Genocide Convention, did not consider
the equal obligations requirement to be essential since the Bosnian Serb forces committing
the genocide did not constitute a state. Genocide Case, supra note 186.
207. See sources cited supra note 4.
208. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 20 to art. 7, ¶ 9, UN. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 30, 44th Sess. 1992 (1994).
209. Brian Gorlick, The Convention and the Committee against Torture:
Complementary Protection Regime for Refugees, 11 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 479 (1999).
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210. Genocide Case, supra note 186, ¶ 173; Legal Consequences of the Construction of
a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131, ¶ 146 (July
9); AUST, supra note 183, at 191; D’Aspremont, supra note 185, at 432; Nolte & Aust, supra
note 183; Quigley, supra note 183.
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sorts of direct benefit from the refugee law regime that they did in its
early years—when it assisted them to cope with mass influxes or to
vindicate strategic political values by “admitting the enemies of their
enemies.” But powerful states still wish to be seen to be committed
to the refugee law regime, most importantly in our view because
staying involved with refugee law is critical to being seen to stand in
solidarity with states of the less developed world where most refugees now stay. If the developed world were to withdraw entirely
from refugee law, the poorer states that today do the lion’s share of
work under the regime might well follow suit—with deleterious consequences for both interstate security and economic well-being, and a
near certainty that more refugees would be compelled to seek protection in the developed world.
The result of this schizophrenia has been the politics of nonentrée, comprising efforts to keep refugees away from wealthy states
without formally resiling from treaty obligations. As the early generation of non-entrée practices—visa controls and carrier sanctions, the
establishment of “international zones,” and high seas deterrence—has
proved increasingly vulnerable to practical and legal challenges, new
forms of non-entrée predicated on interstate cooperation have
emerged in which deterrence is carried out by the authorities of the
home or a transit state, or at least in their territory. As we have
shown, this new generation of non-entrée comprises a range of practices from simple diplomatic agreements to full-scale joint migration
control operations. The critical question we address here is whether
such cooperation-based mechanisms of non-entrée are—as developed
states seem to believe—capable of insulating them from legal liability in ways that the first generation of non-entrée strategies were not.
We believe that three evolving areas of international law—
jurisdiction, shared responsibility, and liability for aiding or assisting—are likely to stymie many if not all of the new forms of nonentrée. The fact that jurisdiction, and hence liability, is now understood to flow not just from territory, but also from authority over individuals in areas beyond a state’s jurisdiction and indeed from the
exercise of public powers abroad, has dramatically expanded the
scope of accountability for core refugee law and related human rights
obligations. Nor are we any longer hampered by the view that only
one state may be held liable for the violation of human rights to
which more than one country contributed: to the contrary, the “all or
nothing” optic has now given way to the view that particularized liability may ensue, and may ensue even when not all states concerned
are bound by the same obligations. And even when no case can be
made for the exercise of jurisdiction under even its modern incarnations, the emerging law on liability for aiding or assisting another
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state to breach its duties under international law has enormous potential to close the accountability gaps that the new generation of nonentrée practices seek to exploit.
Perhaps most intriguing, it seems clear that these contemporary understandings of jurisdiction, shared responsibility, and liability
for aiding or assisting are most likely to be effective in contesting
precisely the variants of the new non-entrée that appeal most to developed countries. While legal liability is least clear where the sponsoring state engages in only diplomatic outreach, the provision of financial incentives, or training of personnel or provision of
equipment, these options are increasingly viewed by developed countries as unattractive given the inherent uncertainties about whether
there will be a solid and dependable deterrent return. The inclination
to become more directly involved in order to achieve more control
and thereby to increase the likelihood of efficacy thus often pushes
states to the more interventionist end of the spectrum of cooperationbased non-entrée. Yet it is when a state’s own personnel are deployed in aid of deterrence abroad or where joint or shared enforcement is established that legal liability becomes most clear.
Powerful states are thus faced with a trade-off between the efficiency of non-entrée mechanisms and the ability to avoid responsibility under international refugee law. If, as we believe probable, the
preference for more rather than less control persists, legal challenges
are likely to prove successful. Law will thus be in a position to serve
a critical role in provoking a frank conversation about how to replace
the duplicitous politics of non-entrée with a system predicated on the
meaningful sharing of the burdens and responsibilities of refugee
protection around the world.211 Because it would be protection rather
than unlawful deterrence that is being shared under such a regime, no
issue of illegality would arise. Such a system could deliver to powerful states the manageability they so keenly seek, but do so in a way
that ensures attention to—rather than avoids—the needs and legitimate aspirations of both refugees and the poorer states that host them.

211. See James C. Hathaway & R. Alexander Neve, Making International Refugee Law
Relevant Again: A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection, 10 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 115, 173–87 (1997). See generally RECONCEIVING INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE
LAW (James C. Hathaway ed., 1997).

